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ARTICLE
FUNCTIONAL GOVERNMENT IN 3-D:
A FRAMEWORK FOR EVALUATING
ALLOCATIONS OF GOVERNMENT AUTHORITY
ALEJANDRO E. CAMACHO* AND ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN**
The creation of new administrative agencies and the realignment of existing
governmental authority are commonplace and high-stakes events, as illustrated
by the recent creation of the Department of Homeland Security after 9/11 and of
new financial regulatory agencies after the global recession of 2009. Scholars
and policymakers have not devoted sufficient attention to this subject, failing to
clearly identify the different dimensions along which government authority may
be structured or to consider the relationships among them. Analysis of these
institutional design issues typically also gives short shrift to whether authority
should be allocated differently based on agency function. These failures have
contributed to reorganization efforts that have proven ill-suited to achieving
policymakers’ goals due to mismatches between the perceived defects of existing
structures and the allocations of authority chosen to replace them. This Article
introduces a framework for assessing how governmental authority may be struc-
tured along three dimensions: centralization, overlap, and coordination. Using
examples from diverse policy areas including national security, financial mar-
kets, and environmental protection, it demonstrates how differentiating among
these dimensions and among particular governmental functions better illumi-
nates the advantages and disadvantages of available structural options. Though
recognizing that the optimal allocation of authority is inexorably context-spe-
cific, the Article concludes with preliminary observations about how certain al-
locations of authority are likely to better promote certain important policy
objectives than others.
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INTRODUCTION
The creation of new programs and administrative agencies and the re-
alignment of existing governmental authority are commonplace. Within just
the past decade, high-profile reorganizations have followed the events of 9/
11 (which led to the massive reshuffling that accompanied the creation of
the Department of Homeland Security),1 the Deepwater Horizon explosion
(which prompted the reallocation of regulatory authority over offshore oil
exploration and development),2 and the late-2000s global recession (which
led to the creation of the Financial Stability Oversight Council and the Con-
sumer Financial Protection Bureau and the merging of the Office of Thrift
Supervision into the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency).3 As in these
1 See generally Dara Kay Cohen, Mariano-Florentino Cue´llar & Barry R. Weingast, Crisis
Bureaucracy: Homeland Security and the Political Design of Legal Mandate, 59 STAN. L.
REV. 673, 718 (2006); Anne Joseph O’Connell, The Architecture of Smart Intelligence: Struc-
turing and Overseeing Agencies in the Post-9/11 World, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1655 (2006).
2 See Secretary of the Interior, Order No. 3299 (May 19, 2010); Reorganization of The
Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation and Enforcement, http://www.boemre.gov.
3 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124
Stat. 1376 (2010).
Other notable reorganization initiatives in just the past few years include a 2013 Executive
Order to coordinate agency efforts to reduce cyber risks to critical infrastructure, Executive
Order: Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity (Feb. 12, 2013), http://www.
whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/02/12/executive-order-improving-critical-infrastructure-
cybersecurity, archived at http://perma.cc/0QnH16Rz6ja; a 2012 proposal to merge the Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission into a new
Securities and Derivatives Commission, H.R. 6613, 112th Cong. (2d Sess. 2012); the creation
in 2009 and rapid elimination in 2012 of a new Center on Climate Change and National Secur-
ity within the Central Intelligence Agency, John M. Broder, C.I.A. Closes Its Climate Change
Office, N.Y. TIMES, (Nov. 20, 2012, 1:39 PM), http://green.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/11/20/c-i-
a-closes-its-climate-change-office/?pagewanted=print&_r=0, archived at http://perma.cc/0m
8zf9tj3qK; a 2012 proposal to increase coordination among seven federal agencies responsible
for conducting space weather research under the supervision of the National Science and Tech-
nology Council, National Priorities for Solar and Space Physics Research and Applications
for Space Weather Prediction: Hearing Before the Subcomm. On Space and Aeronautics of the
H. Comm. On Science, Space, and Technology, 112th Cong. (2012) (statement of Daniel N.
Baker), http://science.house.gov/sites/republicans.science.house.gov/files/documents/HHRG-
112-SY16-WState-DBaker-20121128.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/0Z9MsfHPWLY; and a
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLL\51-1\HLL102.txt unknown Seq: 3 30-JAN-14 8:00
2014] Functional Government in 3-D 21
instances, these changes often occur in response to crisis,4 though the prompt
for program creation or government reorganization sometimes has been the
gradual recognition of deficiencies in existing regulatory programs.5
Scholars and policymakers alike have devoted considerable attention to
the proper allocation of governmental authority, traditionally focusing on the
appropriate scale of government, typically in considering whether authority
should be centralized or decentralized as an issue of federalism.6 Over the
past decade, some scholars have analyzed the appropriateness of jurisdic-
tional overlap.7 More recently, others have sought to account for the value of
coordination among agencies.8 However, these debates over governmental
configuration have insufficiently focused on the relationships among these
different dimensions of authority—whether authority should be centralized
or decentralized, overlapping or distinct, and coordinated or independent.
Additionally, such discussions typically ignore whether the fitness of a par-
2011 proposal to create new regional information and response entities to increase coordina-
tion among federal and state agencies in addressing cancer clusters, S. 76, 112th Cong. (1st
Sess. 2011). See also infra notes 9–21 and accompanying text (describing another important R
recent reorganization proposal).
4 See, e.g., Jody Freeman & Jim Rossi, Agency Coordination in Shared Regulatory Space,
125 HARV. L. REV. 1131, 1152 (2012) (“The most significant government reorganization of
the last fifty years occurred after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, when Congress
opted to combine scores of agencies into DHS, a new ‘mega-agency.’”).
5 The shift of environmental regulatory authority from the states to the federal government
during the 1970s is a prominent example. See RICHARD J. LAZARUS, THE MAKING OF ENVIRON-
MENTAL LAW 67 (2004).
6 See generally Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425
(1987); Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Federalism as a Safeguard of the Separation of Powers, 112
COLUM. L. REV. 459 (2012); William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections
Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663 (1974); Daniel C. Esty, Revitalizing Environmental Feder-
alism, 95 MICH. L. REV. 570 (1996) [hereinafter Esty, Environmental Federalism]; Daniel C.
Esty, Toward Optimal Environmental Governance, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1495, 1562 (1999)
[hereinafter Esty, Environmental Governance]; Gillian E. Metzger, Federalism and Federal
Agency Reform, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (2011); Richard L. Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate
Competition: Rethinking the “Race to the Bottom” Rationale for Federal Environmental Regu-
lation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1210 (1992); Richard B. Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice? Problems
of Federalism in Mandating State Implementation of National Environmental Policy, 86 YALE
L.J. 1196 (1977).
7 See generally PREEMPTION CHOICE: THE THEORY, LAW, AND REALITY OF FEDERALISM’S
CORE QUESTION (William W. Buzbee ed., Cambridge U. Press 2009); ROBERT A. SCHAPIRO,
POLYPHONIC FEDERALISM (Columbia U. Press 2009); David E. Adelman & Kirsten H. Engel,
Adaptive Federalism: The Case Against Reallocating Environmental Regulatory Authority, 92
MINN. L. REV. 1796 (2008); Ann Carlson, Iterative Federalism and Climate Change, 103 NW.
U. L. REV. 1097 (2009); William W. Buzbee, Recognizing the Regulatory Commons: A Theory
of Regulatory Gaps, 89 IOWA L. REV. 1 (2003); J.R. DeShazo & Jody Freeman, Public Agen-
cies as Lobbyists, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 2217 (2005); Kirsten H. Engel, Harnessing the Benefits
of Dynamic Federalism in Environmental Law, 56 EMORY L.J. 159 (2006); Heather K. Gerken,
Federalism All the Way Down, 124 HARV. L. REV. 4 (2010); J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman,
Climate Change, Dead Zones, and Massive Problems in the Administrative State: A Guide for
Whittling Away, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 59 (2010).
8 See, e.g., Robert B. Ahdieh, The Visible Hand: Coordination Functions of the Regula-
tory State, 95 MINN. L. REV. 578 (2010); Eric Biber, Too Many Things to Do: How to Deal
with the Dysfunctions of Multiple-Goal Agencies, 33 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1 (2009); Keith
Bradley, The Design of Agency Interactions, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 745 (2011); Freeman &
Rossi, supra note 4. R
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ticular allocation should depend on the governmental function being exer-
cised. We use the word function to refer to the nature of the authority
engaged in by, or the role assigned to, an agency (such as monitoring, infor-
mation dissemination, financing, planning, standard setting, or enforcement),
as opposed to the substantive subject matter of the agency’s delegated au-
thority. This Article addresses these neglected dimensional and functional
aspects of the analysis of allocating authority and sheds light on how these
features illuminate the policy tradeoffs among alternative structural designs.
A recent reorganization proposal concerning small business regulation
serves as a useful introduction to the Article’s multi-dimensional and func-
tional analysis. In 2012, President Obama proposed to consolidate six agen-
cies into a single new Department that would more efficiently promote
competitiveness, exports, and American business.9 The six agencies—the
business and trade functions of the U.S. Department of Commerce, the
Small Business Administration, the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative,
the Export-Import Bank, the Overseas Private Investment Corporation, and
the U.S. Trade and Development Agency—all focus primarily on business
and trade. The White House and others10 explained that overlapping respon-
sibilities among these agencies had made it hard for small businesses to in-
teract with the government and contributed to “unnecessary waste and
duplication.”11 To address these concerns, the Obama proposal would cen-
tralize authority by integrating the programs of the six eliminated agencies
into four divisions of the new Department. The Administration and congres-
9 The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, President Obama Announces Proposal
to Reform, Reorganize and Consolidate Government (Jan. 13, 2012) [hereinafter Consolidate
Government], http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/01/13/president-obama-an-
nounces-proposal-reform-reorganize-and-consolidate-gov, archived at http://perma.cc/0PprRj
A5bBs. The proposal was introduced in different forms in the Senate and the House of Repre-
sentatives in 2012. See S. 2129, 112th Cong. (2d Sess. 2012); H.R. 4409, 112th Cong. (2d
Sess. 2012). Though the bill did not advance to a vote, the Obama Administration announced
its intention to support the proposals in the 113th Congress. See Al Kamen, The Secretary of
What, Now?, WASH. POST, Dec. 20, 2012, http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2012-12-19/
politics/35929276_1_president-obama-second-obama-term-jay-carney, archived at http://
perma.cc/0xR7cWGu2sw. In mid-2013, President Obama delivered remarks in which he re-
peated his call for a delegation of expanded presidential authority to reorganize agency author-
ity without making explicit reference to the reorganization of business-related agencies. The
White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Remarks by the President Presenting New Man-
agement Agenda (July 8, 2013), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/07/08/re-
marks-president-presenting-new-management-agenda, archived at http://perma.cc/0urLfpGdd
tr.
10 See Retooling Government for the 21st Century: The President’s Reorganization Plan
and Reducing Duplication: Hearing Before the S. Comm. On Homeland Security and Govern-
mental Affairs, 112th Cong. 2 (2012) (statement of Sen. Tom Carper (D-Del.)), available at
http://www.hsgac.senate.gov/hearings/retooling-government-for-the-21st-century-the-presi-
dents-reorganization-plan-and-reducing-duplication (describing undesirable duplication cre-
ated by the existence of multiple agencies “that produce statistical output as a part of their
programmatic responsibilities”).
11 The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Government Reorganization Fact Sheet
(Jan. 13, 2012), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/01/13/govern-
ment-reorganization-fact-sheet, archived at http://perma.cc/0UqYpHwSdYe.
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sional allies asserted that this consolidation would create a more efficient
and effective structure for promoting American business by eliminating du-
plication and overlap12 and increasing coordination.13 The Department would
also create “a one-stop shop for everything from financing and export pro-
motion to patent protection and help commercializing innovative discover-
ies,” allowing small business owners to work with one agency in receiving
“the core Government services that will help them compete, grow, and
hire.”14
Like so many other reorganizations, the Administration’s proposal un-
fortunately conflates the three distinctive dimensions of authority identified
by this Article—the extent of centralization, overlap, and coordination of
authority among agencies. As a result, it fails to propose a structure that is
likely to directly address the Administration’s underlying concerns. The pro-
posed reorganization is designed to minimize overlap in agency authority
and increase coordination. However, the proposed solution is poorly de-
signed to promote those goals. It focuses on reallocating authority along
only one dimension of authority—the centralization of the responsibilities of
six agencies into a single new Department. Yet the purported problems relate
to agency structure and relationships along two entirely different dimensions
(unnecessary overlap and lack of interagency coordination). Centralizing au-
thority may or may not decrease the overlap of authority or increase the level
of agency coordination.15 The proposed new Department, in fact, would be
comprised of four divisions (small business, trade and investment, technol-
ogy and innovation, and statistics) with seemingly overlapping jurisdic-
tions.16 Conversely, though decentralized authority can also overlap, it need
not do so.17 For example, duplication among decentralized institutions can be
reduced without centralizing authority if the jurisdiction of existing agencies
is redefined so that each agency has distinct rather than overlapping respon-
sibilities. Similarly, both centralized and decentralized allocations of author-
ity can be highly coordinated or independent.18 It is possible to require
12 See, e.g., Consolidate Government, supra note 9; Retooling Government for the 21st R
Century: The President’s Reorganization Plan and Reducing Duplication: Hearing Before the
S. Comm. On Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 112th Cong. 4 (2012) (testimony
of Daniel Werfel, Controller of the Office of Management and Budget), available at http://
www.hsgac.senate.gov/hearings/retooling-government-for-the-21st-century-the-presidents-re-
organization-plan-and-reducing-duplication; Government Reorganization Fact Sheet, supra
note 11. R
13 See, e.g., Statement of Sen. Tom Carper, supra note 10, at 2. R
14 Testimony of Daniel Werfel, supra note 12, at 4. R
15 See, e.g., Freeman & Rossi, supra note 4, at 1173 (noting that it is possible to achieve R
coordination “without strong centralized authority”).
16 See Testimony of Daniel Werfel, supra note 12, at 4. For example, the small business R
and statistics divisions may have overlapping authority over statistics pertaining to small busi-
nesses, and the small business and trade and investment divisions may have overlapping juris-
diction over trade and investment issues pertaining to small businesses.
17 See infra Part IV.B.1.
18 See infra Part IV.B.2.
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increased coordination among multiple agencies without centralization of
authority or reduction in the number of agencies with relevant jurisdiction.
By conflating coordinated and distinct authority with centralization, the Ad-
ministration’s proposal missed an opportunity to tailor its reorganization to
actually fix the perceived flaws of the existing government structure.
In addition to these dimensions of governmental authority, the Obama
reorganization proposal highlights another feature of governmental organiza-
tion that is often overlooked—functional jurisdiction. Regulatory authority
is organized not only substantively but also on the basis of different govern-
mental functions.19 Three of the divisions proposed for the new Department
would be organized around substantive authority—the small business, trade
and investment, and technology and innovation divisions—while the re-
maining one would be organized around an information-gathering func-
tion—the production and analysis of statistics. As this Article explains,
focusing on functional jurisdiction provides a number of key insights. For
one, two government agencies with substantive authority over the same is-
sue—for example, small businesses—will not have overlapping authority if
their functions are distinct. The small business division, for instance, may be
charged with planning, standard-setting, and implementation functions re-
garding small businesses, while the statistics division may be charged with
information gathering on those small businesses. Functional division among
multiple agencies with jurisdiction over the same subject therefore can re-
duce duplication even without centralization of agency authority.
Focusing on the largely neglected functional aspect of organization and
clearly delineating the differences among the three dimensions of authority
provides further valuable insights. In particular, this Article demonstrates
that the optimal organizational structure along the three dimensions is likely
to differ depending on the particular governmental function at issue.20 It may
make sense, for example, to centralize information-gathering authority, such
as in the proposed small business division for production and analysis of
statistics. At the same time, a decentralized but coordinated structure for
program implementation, such as by retaining separate agencies for facilitat-
ing trade by and investment in small businesses, may be advisable. As with
many prior regulatory design reforms, the Obama reorganization proposal’s
conflation of the dimensions of authority and inattention to functional juris-
diction obscured the tradeoffs that different reorganization options entail. It
is virtually impossible to appreciate the policy tradeoffs involved in choos-
ing how to organize government without understanding the existence of (and
relationship between) these three different dimensions and the availability of
different configurations based on function.
Analysis of the structures, jurisdictions, and relationships among gov-
ernmental institutions is vital to understanding and promoting their efficacy
19 See infra Part II.
20 See infra Part IV.A.
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at advancing public goals.21 Yet institutional design questions such as these
are regularly overlooked, misanalyzed, or oversimplified.22 Given the recur-
rence of government reorganization efforts and the high-stakes conse-
quences they may entail, this Article provides an analytical framework for
assessing when realignment of agency authority is likely to be beneficial and
how it ought to proceed when circumstances warrant it. Using examples
from a range of regulatory areas, it demonstrates how differentiating the
choices of when to centralize, create overlap, and require coordination
among governmental institutions illuminates the advantages and disadvan-
tages of competing reorganization options. The Article also explains how
focusing on the particular governmental function at issue further clarifies the
advantages and disadvantages of movement along the three dimensions of
centralization, overlap, and coordination.
The Article proceeds in five Parts. Part I briefly describes the principal
values that tend to be implicated in government reorganization efforts and
that may be useful in assessing the merits of a particular initiative. Parts II
and III provide a taxonomy of the different means of allocating (and reallo-
cating) authority among government entities. Part II highlights a key but
underappreciated distinction between the substantive jurisdiction of regula-
tors and the locus of control over different governmental functions—what
we call functional jurisdiction. Affording attention to functional jurisdiction
provides insights about the policy and value tradeoffs among available op-
tions for allocating government authority that may otherwise be obscured.
Part III delineates the dimensions of primary importance for characterizing
allocation of regulatory authority—the extent to which jurisdiction is cen-
tralized or decentralized, overlapping or distinct, and coordinated or
independent.
Part IV illustrates the utility of the analytical framework introduced in
Parts II and III, using a range of examples. Many of the examples involve
21 As Professor Magill has succinctly put it, “institutions matter.” Elizabeth Magill,
Agency Self-Regulation, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 859, 903 (2009). See also Jason Marisam,
Interagency Administration, 45 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 183, 185 (2013) (arguing that “agency intercon-
nectedness will become even more rooted in the bureaucracy over time, as regulatory problems
show no sign of becoming simpler and more amenable to single-agency solutions”).
22 As stated by Dean Phil Weiser:
The question of how to design and operate public institutions is often relegated to a
second order consideration and takes a backseat to the analysis of substantive policy
issues. . . . In particular, few commentators or policymakers have focused on the
question of what institutional strategy, structure, or set of processes . . . to use and
how any such regime would operate in practice.
The impact of institutional issues as an influence on the ultimate success of an
agency is grossly underappreciated. . . . Consequently, any focus on agency effec-
tiveness needs to ask how an agency is doing its work and not merely what work it
purports to be doing. Indeed, even the best-crafted statutory or regulatory regime
will fail if the institutional structure, processes, and culture undermine the ability to
implement the regime’s goals effectively.
Philip J. Weiser, Towards an International Dialogue on the Institutional Side of Antitrust, 66
N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 445, 447–48 (2011) (citations omitted).
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environmental regulation and natural resource management, although we
draw on examples involving many other forms of regulation. We believe that
the analysis in this Article is relevant to any form of government organiza-
tion. We derive three key lessons about the role of functional jurisdiction and
the value of clearly distinguishing among the different dimensions of gov-
ernmental authority. First, Part IV discusses how both policymakers and the
substantial federalism and governance literature have largely both neglected
the significance of functional jurisdiction and conflated the dimensions iden-
tified in Part III in analyzing the relative merit of alternative governmental
structures. Second, it explains how our focus on functional jurisdiction en-
riches the analysis of the most promising ways to allocate governmental au-
thority along a different combination of dimensions based on the agency
function involved. Third, Part IV illustrates how crisp delineations among
the various dimensions of governmental authority clarify the analysis of the
tradeoffs among the policy values discussed in Part I that alternative organi-
zational options entail. By using this analytical framework, policymakers
will be better able to select the government structure that strikes an appropri-
ate balance among competing or conflicting values.
Undoubtedly, the appropriate choices along each of the dimensions, and
decisions on whether to differentiate structure based on function, will neces-
sarily be context-specific. In Part V, we nonetheless provide preliminary ob-
servations about the relative merits of allocating governmental authority for
each governmental function at different points along the three dimensions.
We assert that arguments for centralization and coordination are likely to be
more persuasive for certain kinds of agency research, information distribu-
tion, and financing functions. We also posit that, in general, arguments for
decentralized authority usually will be strongest for implementation and en-
forcement functions, and to a lesser extent planning. Likewise, though the
considerable calls for increased coordination among regulatory authorities
may often be persuasive for functions such as financing, information distri-
bution, planning, and even standard setting, we assert that the benefits from
maintaining regulator independence and even competition will typically be
stronger for agencies performing implementation and enforcement functions.
Finally, although we largely concur with the growing literature promoting
the value of shared substantive jurisdiction,23 we postulate that providing for
distinct functional jurisdiction will often provide opportunities to maintain
the advantages of redundancy while minimizing its disadvantages.
I. NORMATIVE CONSIDERATIONS FOR ALLOCATION OF AUTHORITY
Determining how best to allocate the authority to design and implement
government programs requires a comparative assessment of the extent to
23 See the sources cited infra Part III.B.2 discussing the benefits of overlapping
jurisdiction.
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which alternative allocations promote desired normative values or considera-
tions. We use four such evaluative yardsticks in the discussion below: effec-
tiveness, efficiency, equity, and legitimacy.24 When these measures point in
different directions, determining the optimal balance requires choosing
among allocations that promote some but not other values better than the
available alternatives.
A. Effectiveness
An effective regulatory design is one that achieves the identified regu-
latory goals.25 A regulatory program that fails to achieve its goals cannot be
deemed a success even if it operates efficiently and fairly and is adminis-
tered by accountable officials.26 The effectiveness of a government program
may depend not only on how governmental authority is allocated, but also
on whether it is feasible to achieve the identified goals, whether sufficient
resources are available to government officials, and whether those officials
have the requisite expertise to implement the program.27 Our focus is on the
impact of government structure on program effectiveness. Decentralized
government authority, for example, may create uncertainty about the juris-
dictional contours of affected agencies. If so, a problem that could have been
addressed effectively by any of the affected agencies may instead be ignored
by all of them.
B. Efficiency
Assuming multiple options of equal efficacy exist, some may operate
more efficiently than others. Efficiency involves committing no more re-
sources—including the administrative costs a program imposes on govern-
ment and the compliance costs imposed on the private sector—to addressing
a problem than necessary.28 Institutional design may bear on the efficiency
of government action. For example, the costs of administering redundant
24 Administrative law scholars have used similar metrics to evaluate regulatory programs.
See, e.g., Roger C. Cramton, Administrative Procedure Reform: The Effects of S. 1663 on the
Conduct of Federal Rate Proceedings, 16 ADMIN. L. REV. 108, 111–12 (1964) (offering accu-
racy, efficiency, and acceptability to agency, participants, and the public as metrics).
25 Freeman & Rossi, supra note 4, at 1150. R
26 Cf. Sidney A. Shapiro, A Delegation Theory of the APA, 10 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 89, 107
(1996) (referring to effectiveness as an administrative process value).
27 See, e.g., Richard Briffault, A Government for Our Time? Business Improvement Dis-
tricts and Urban Governance, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 365, 460 (1999) (discussing relevance of
resource adequacy to effectiveness of regulation); Sidney A. Shapiro, Agency Priority Setting
and the Review of Existing Agency Rules, 48 ADMIN. L. REV. 370, 374 (1996).
28  See, e.g., Freeman & Rossi, supra note 4, at 1181–82. Efforts to improve efficiency R
seek to “minimize the administrative costs of enforcement.” Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas
Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85
HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1093 (1972).
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLL\51-1\HLL102.txt unknown Seq: 10 30-JAN-14 8:00
28 Harvard Journal on Legislation [Vol. 51
structures “represent lost funds for other tasks. In other words, if resources
are fixed, redundant structures impose additional opportunity costs.”29
C. Equity
Although the concept of equity involves distributional considerations,
there are different ways to determine whether a particular allocation of soci-
etal benefits and burdens is fair.30 Policy analysts of regulatory issues some-
times use equity to refer to everything other than efficiency.31 Dan Farber has
used the term to include “any standard for determining the just distribution
of resources.”32 One widely used distinction is between distributive and cor-
rective justice. The former deals with the allocation of desirable resources in
proportion to the “possession of some morally relevant characteristic” such
as humanity (which supports an egalitarian distribution) or virtue (which
favors some more than others).33 Corrective (or compensatory) justice
“seeks to correct transactional wrongs” by requiring wrongdoers to compen-
sate those whom they harm, and may turn on whether mere causation is
sufficient to trigger a compensatory obligation or whether fault is also re-
quired.34 Making matters even more complex, distributional concerns may
arise in several guises, including vertical,35 horizontal,36 geographical,37 and
29 O’Connell, supra note 1, at 1680. R
30 See CHRISTOPHER D. STONE, THE GNAT IS OLDER THAN MAN: GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT
AND HUMAN AGENDA 252 (1993) (discussing the “difficulties of sorting through . . . compet-
ing standards of ‘fairness’ to find the morally right one”).
31 See, e.g., Wallace Wen-Yeu Wang & James Ting-Yeh Yang, Financial Institutions in
Taiwan: An Analysis of the Regulatory Scheme, 4 J. CHINESE L. 3, 33 (1990); Kenneth G.
Elzinga, The Goals of Antitrust: Other than Competition and Efficiency, What Else Counts?,
125 U. PA. L. REV. 1191, 1192 (1977). But cf. Douglas A. Kysar, Sustainable Development
and Private Global Governance, 83 TEX. L. REV. 2109, 2160 (2004) (discussing market liber-
alism’s “view that efficiency, equity, and sustainability are separable goals”).
32 Daniel A. Farber, What (If Anything) Can Economics Say About Equity?, 101 MICH. L.
REV. 1791, 1794 (2003).
33 Nathan B. Oman, The Honor of Private Law, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 31, 38 (2011). See
also STONE, supra note 30, at 247–48 (describing distributive justice as dealing with “situa- R
tional disparities,” not actions).
34 Oman, supra note 33, at 38. R
35 Vertical equity implicates “the fairness of the distribution of wealth among different
income groups.” Robert C. Ellickson, Suburban Growth Controls: An Economic and Legal
Analysis, 86 YALE L. J. 385, 415 (1977). A disaster preparedness plan that facilitated evacua-
tion of affected wealthy but not poor neighborhoods would raise vertical equity concerns.
Vertical equity concerns are the focus of the environmental justice movement, which posits
that all persons are equally entitled to protection from environmental harm. ROBERT R.M.
VERCHICK, FACING CATASTROPHE: ENVIRONMENTAL ACTION FOR A POST-KATRINA WORLD 118
(2010).
36 “Horizontal equity requires government to treat like persons alike.” Ellickson, supra
note 35, at 415. A plan that required individuals of similar income levels to pay different R
amounts to finance protection measures, on the basis of some characteristic unrelated to the
degree of benefit individuals would accrue from the plan, would invoke horizontal equity
concerns.
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temporal.38 Institutional design may have equitable implications. Centralized
authority, for example, may diminish the likelihood that decisionmakers will
be cognizant of and address unique local circumstances that merit differen-
tial rather than uniform treatment. On the other hand, decentralized decision
making may increase the risk of disparate treatment of similarly situated
entities in different jurisdictions because decisionmakers are not aware of or
disagree with what other regulators are doing.
D. Legitimacy
Although there is broad consensus that legitimacy is a core administra-
tive law concern, and thus bears on the structure of government,39 legitimacy
encompasses multiple considerations, which scholars define and assess dif-
ferently.40 We focus here on the aspects of legitimacy most relevant to as-
sessing alternative ways to organize government regulatory or management
programs. Legitimacy may be defined as “the acceptability of [a] regulation
to those involved in its development,”41 which may be enhanced through the
availability of opportunities for public participation.42 Social psychologists
contend that participation enhances perceptions of legitimacy “indepen-
37 Geographic concerns may arise from a regime that concentrates health and safety risks
in a particular location, such as the area surrounding a waste disposal facility or a high-volume
pollution source.
38 Temporal equity deals with “the preservation or defeat of expectation interests.” RICH-
ARD B. STEWART & JAMES B. KRIER, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY: READINGS, MATERI-
ALS AND NOTES 168 (2d ed. 1978). Temporal concerns, for example, may arise when a
government program foists costs on future generations that will not be able to enjoy the bene-
fits of the resource allocations that produce those costs. See generally Neil H. Buchanan, What
Kind of Environment Do We Owe Future Generations?, 15:2 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 339
(2011). These concerns would be implicated, for example, if the government chose to indefi-
nitely forestall taking steps to avoid damage caused by the activities of the present generation,
even though it would be far more expensive to resolve the issue on a deferred basis.
39 See, e.g., Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond Accountability: Arbitrariness and Legitimacy
in the Administrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 461, 462 (2003) (“From the birth of the admin-
istrative state, we have struggled to describe our regulatory government as the legitimate child
of a constitutional democracy.”); Sidney A. Shapiro, et al., The Enlightenment of Administra-
tive Law: Looking Inside the Agency for Legitimacy, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 463, 463
(2012) (“The history of administrative law in the United States constitutes a series of ongoing
attempts to legitimize unelected public administration in a constitutional liberal democracy.”).
40 See Shapiro, et al., supra note 39, at 466 (“Legitimacy is a notoriously treacherous R
concept.”).
41 Jody Freeman & Laura I. Langbein, Regulatory Negotiation and the Legitimacy Benefit,
9 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 60, 63 (2000).
42 Transparency also promotes legitimacy because it “tends both to improve the quality of
decisions and to facilitate accountability to the electorate.” William H. Simon, Democracy and
Organization: The Further Reformation of American Administrative Law, at 42, 7–8, available
at http://www.utexas.edu/law/journals/tlr/sources/Volume%2091/Issue%207/Metzger/metzger.
fn075.simon.democracy_and_organization.pdf (arguing that transparency fosters “openness to
ongoing diffuse democratic pressures”).
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dently of whether outcomes ultimately favor . . . participants.”43 In addition,
opportunities to participate are consistent with democratic government.44
The legitimacy of a regulatory system also turns on the degree to which
it protects against deviation from legislative goals due to capture of regula-
tors by special interests.45 Regulators with conflicts of interest are especially
vulnerable to capture.46 Procedural mechanisms such as transparency and op-
portunities to participate can combat capture.47 So, too, can the availability
of judicial review, which may be invoked by stakeholders to prevent those
implementing regulatory programs from straying beyond legislative
bounds.48
Similarly, perceptions that decision makers are honest, unbiased and
competent promote legitimacy.49 In addition, assigning tasks to those with
expertise and providing them the tools to perform such tasks can also in-
crease the likelihood that programs will operate effectively, illustrating that
the four values we have identified are interrelated and may overlap.50 Like-
wise, the requirement that agencies provide reasons for their decisions that
are based on facts and rooted in the agencies’ statutory authority provide
constraints that promote legitimacy.51 Institutional design can affect the le-
gitimacy of a government program. Shared regulatory authority, for exam-
43 Freeman & Langbein, supra note 41, at 67 (citing E. ALLAN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, R
THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL JUSTICE (1988)).
44 See id. at 133 (noting that broad participation and inclusiveness are generally laudable
goals and that, “all things being equal,” greater participation is more consistent with demo-
cratic values than less participation). Cynthia Farina has called government decision making
that reflects the “will of the people” “the wellspring of legitimacy.” Cynthia R. Farina, The
Consent of the Governed: Simple Rules for a Complex World, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 987, 990
(1997). Government processes that are fair enhance “identification with, and commitment to,
the legal-political system.” Id. at 1035.
45 Freeman & Rossi, supra note 4, at 1185–87 (addressing the risks of capture of agen- R
cies). A captured agency seeks to promote the agenda of those to which it is beholden, even if
that agenda deviates from statutory goals.
46 See Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The OCC’s Preemption Rules Exceed the Agency’s Author-
ity and Present a Serious Threat to the Dual Banking System and Consumer Protection, 23
ANN. REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 225, 232 (2004).
47 See Roberta S. Karmel & Claire R. Kelly, The Hardening of Soft Law in Securities
Regulation, 34 BROOK. J. INT’L. L. 883, 946 (2008).
48 See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, On the Costs and Benefits of Aggressive Judicial Review of
Agency Action, 1989 DUKE L.J. 522, 525 (1989) (discussing the traditional view that “the
basic function of the courts might be described as the promotion of ‘legitimacy’ in the adminis-
trative process”).
49 See, e.g., Farina, supra note 44, at 1035 (noting that legitimacy is the result of public R
confidence in the competence and trustworthiness of officials); Terence R. Mitchell & William
G. Scott, Leadership Failures, the Distrusting Public, and Prospects of the Administrative
State, 47 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 445, 446–47 (1987) (explaining that vesting decision-making au-
thority in those with expertise on issues within their jurisdiction can enhance the perception of
competence, and therefore foster legitimacy).
50 See Freeman & Rossi, supra note 4, at 1185 (arguing that programs capable of improv- R
ing analysis by adding data and expertise are “likely to make decisions better”). Another
overlap involves consistent treatment of similarly situated entities, which promotes both a
sense of non-arbitrariness (and therefore of legitimacy) and of fair treatment.
51 This requirement of “deliberation” enhances accountability by guarding against arbi-
trariness. Emily Hammond & David L. Markell, Administrative Proxies for Judicial Review:
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ple, that authorizes one agency to review and veto the decision of another
can be useful in combating capture.52
E. Balancing Values in Allocating Government Authority
The four evaluative yardsticks discussed above are not meant to be an
exclusive recitation of the values implicated by government organization or
reorganization. They are among the most important measures for assessing
an allocation of governmental authority, however. Although it is possible
that all four criteria will support a particular allocation, an initiative designed
to promote one of the measures often may adversely affect one or more of
the others.53 The proper balance among the four criteria identified here will
necessarily be context-specific.54 For example, it may be preferable to reject
the option that promises to most effectively achieve regulatory goals if that
option is harshly inequitable or vests in decision-makers authority that
threatens legitimacy. These kinds of tradeoffs of course are common under
the American system of government.55 As long as the yardsticks are clearly
identified and the impact of a particular allocation on each is assessed,
policymakers will be able to make informed decisions on the best way to
achieve an appropriate balance among them. Parts III through V below illus-
trate in more detail the kinds of tradeoffs likely to be implicated in choosing
among possible allocations of authority.
Building Legitimacy from the Inside-Out, 37 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 313, 316 (2013). The
reasons requirement provides evidence of a commitment to rationality. Id. at 325.
52 See, e.g., Eric Biber, The More the Merrier: Multiple Agencies and the Future of Ad-
ministrative Law Scholarship, 125 HARV. L. REV. F. 78, 81 (2012). Cf. Rachel E. Barkow,
Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture Through Institutional Design, 89 TEX. L. REV. 15, 55
(2010) (arguing that “if the insulated agency’s enforcement authority is merely shared with
another agency, but the other agency does not have the ability to veto the insulated agency’s
enforcement decisions, this structure does not formally undercut the insulated agency’s author-
ity to bring actions to protect the beneficiaries of the regulation. Rather, this structure puts
more cops on the beat to ensure that an agency’s rules or a statute’s requirements are taken
seriously.”).
53 See, e.g., Biber, supra note 52, at 79 (“So long as there are multiple things for the R
government to do, there will always be a question about what organizational structure will
allow it to be most successful in dealing with the interactions among . . . different goals.”).
54 Accountability, for example, “guarantees responsiveness, although not necessarily ef-
fectiveness.” O’Connell, supra note 1, at 1719. R
55 See, e.g., Immigration and Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 944 (1983)
(stating that “the fact that a given law or procedure is efficient, convenient, and useful in
facilitating functions of government, standing alone, will not save it if it is contrary to the
Constitution. Convenience and efficiency are not the primary objectives—or the hallmarks—
of democratic government. . . .”); id. at 958–59 (stating that “the Framers ranked other values
higher than efficiency.”). The Court, in striking down the legislative veto in Chadha, empha-
sized the Framers’ choice to sacrifice efficient government for accountable, democratic govern-
ment through the imposition of requirements such as bicameralism and presentment. See id. at
959.
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II. SUBSTANTIVE AND FUNCTIONAL ALLOCATIONS OF AUTHORITY
Regulatory authority can be assigned in two different ways. First, an
agency’s jurisdiction can be determined on the basis of the subject matter it
is authorized to regulate or manage (such as activities that result in air pollu-
tion or mineral extraction on public lands). Second, jurisdiction can be de-
fined in terms of the functions an agency performs, such that different
agencies may be responsible for performing discrete tasks (such as standard
setting, permitting, and enforcement) within the same substantive area. For
example, as illustrated in Figure 1 below, although federal pollution control
authority could be apportioned into substantive silos according to the partic-
ular type of resource (e.g., air, water, or solid waste), such authority could
also be divided into functional categories according to the governmental ac-
tivity at issue (e.g., standard setting, permitting, and enforcement). Alterna-
tively (and more commonly), a legislature or administrative agency might
adopt a hybrid of substantive and functional allocations in creating or reor-
ganizing authority, in which agencies are only provided authority over cer-
tain regulatory functions for particular types of resources or regulatory
problems.56
Figure 1. Substantive and Functional Jurisdiction
In characterizing governmental jurisdiction, primary attention tends to
be given to evaluating agency management based on the scope of the sub-
stantive authority of the governmental entity. However, regulatory authority
56 See infra notes 71–78 and accompanying text (describing organization of EPA and the R
Internal Revenue Service).
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is also consistently apportioned based on the function or functions that a
particular governmental institution may exercise.57 Though some scholars
have noted the existence of division of authority along functional lines,58 the
significance of this component is considerably underappreciated in the regu-
latory design literature.59
A. Substantive Jurisdiction
Perhaps the most elementary component for assessing how authority is
allocated in the management of social problems for which regulatory pro-
grams have been created is substantive jurisdiction. Congress grants to ad-
ministrative agencies limited substantive authority to regulate or manage
specific social issues or problems. Workplace health and safety falls within
the purview of the Occupational Safety and Health Administration. The U.S.
Department of Agriculture deals with the agriculture industry. Transportation
infrastructure is addressed by the Federal Highway Administration and the
Department of Transportation. Immigration is an activity supervised by the
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services. The Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention conduct disease research and coordinate disease prevention
measures. The Federal Emergency Management Agency is charged with
conducting disaster planning and management.
In environmental regulation, administrative authority is typically re-
stricted to regulation or management of a particular environmental resource
(such as clean air or clean water). Indeed, substantive authority may be fur-
ther divided based on particular features or components of a protected re-
source or “medium.” For example, surface water quality is regulated by the
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and designated state water
quality agencies (such as California’s State Water Resources Control Board),
while the allocation of water supply falls within the domains of different
state and local water resources agencies (such as the California Department
of Water Resources and Metropolitan Water District of Southern California).
Similarly, management of terrestrial or freshwater (including endangered or
threatened) species is under the jurisdiction of the Interior Department’s
United States Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS), while marine species are
managed by the Commerce Department’s National Marine Fisheries Service.
Public land management is divided based on particular land management
57 See infra Part II.B.
58 Scholars investigating government organization who do refer to agency functions fre-
quently do so in a different sense than we are using that term. Rather than focusing on the
different kinds of tasks agencies perform, these scholars use functions to describe the scope of
an agency’s substantive jurisdiction (such as the authority to regulate air pollution, but not
water pollution). See, e.g., David A. Hyman & William E. Kovacic, Competition Agencies with
Complex Policy Portfolios: Divide or Conquer? (forthcoming) (Feb. 20, 2013 draft at 11–12),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2110351 (discussing the allo-
cation of authority among three agencies to provide services for veterans).
59 See infra Part IV.A.1.
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goals, with the National Park Service (NPS) and the U.S. Fish and Wildlife
Service (FWS) being charged primarily with the duty to preserve natural
resources and provide recreational opportunities, while the U.S. Forest Ser-
vice (USFS) and the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) are required to
promote a broader range of multiple uses of the lands under their
jurisdiction.60
Such division is not unique to pollution control or natural resources
law. Some food products are generally regulated by the Food and Drug Ad-
ministration, while other foods (meat, poultry, and processed egg products)
are under the jurisdiction of the United States Department of Agriculture’s
Food Safety and Inspection Service.61 The Dodd-Frank Act62 vested authority
to regulate providers of consumer financial products and services, including
insured banks, savings and loans, and large credit unions, in one agency, but
delegated to a different agency regulatory control over smaller depository
institutions, and retained authority in still other agencies to regulate transac-
tions in securities and commodities futures.63 In addition, “informational pri-
vacy is governed by a variety of different laws, administered by different
agencies . . . setting forth divergent requirements governing the treatment of
information by type and business sector.”64
Relatedly, substantive authority may be delegated to a particular au-
thority in recognition of that agency’s technical expertise that may be
brought to bear on the regulatory problem. For example, an expertise in at-
mospheric chemistry is useful for understanding and regulating air quality,
an ecology background for managing biological resources, a public health or
medical background for disease prevention, or forestry expertise for forest
management.65 California has vested multiple agencies with authority to reg-
ulate different aspects of the electric utility industry to reflect the expertise
60 See 1 GEORGE CAMERON COGGINS & ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN, PUBLIC NATURAL RE-
SOURCES LAW §§ 6:14-6:17 (West 2d ed. 2007).
61 See Drugs, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/default.htm (last
visited Oct. 6, 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/0K6JQ5PHw29; Cosmetics, U.S. FOOD &
DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/Cosmetics/default.htm (last visited Oct. 6, 2013), archived
at http://perma.cc/0QSjXyG8eKX; Foods, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/
Food/default.htm (last visited Oct. 6, 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/0BKKQgpiKk7 (iden-
tifying FDA authorities); About Us, U.S. FOOD SAFETY & INSPECTION SERV., http://www.
fsis.usda.gov/About_FSIS/index.asp (last visited Oct. 6, 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/
0MTctxecTmB (outlining FSIC authorities).
62 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No., 111-203,
124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
63 Elizabeth R. Schiltz, The Paradox of the Global and the Local in the Financial Crisis of
2008: Applying the Lessons of Caritas in Veritate to the Regulation of Consumer Credit in the
United States and the European Union, 26 J.L. & RELIGION 173, 183–84 (2010).
64 Kenneth A. Bamberger & Deirdre K. Mulligan, Privacy on the Books and on the
Ground, 63 STAN. L. REV. 247, 257 (2011).
65 For discussion of how different scientific disciplines affect the design and management
of natural resource regulatory systems, see Eric Biber, Which Science? Whose Science? How
Scientific Disciplines Can Shape Environmental Law, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 471 (2012).
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of each agency.66 Similarly, scholars have urged expansion of the Copyright
Office’s authority over complex and dynamic issues in which it has
expertise.67
B. Functional Jurisdiction
Although the academic literature often focuses on agencies’ substantive
jurisdiction, the manner in which Congress allocates authority along func-
tional lines also may bear on the degree to which a regulatory program
achieves statutory goals. Governmental authority may be organized accord-
ing to the particular regulatory activities or tasks in which the agency is
authorized to engage. Thus, although a statute may delegate to several agen-
cies the authority to regulate a particular set of private activities, each
agency may be in charge of a particular aspect of the regulatory program.
One agency, for example, may be responsible for collecting information
needed to make regulatory decisions, while another may be charged with
using that information to adopt regulatory standards that constrain private
conduct. Agency functions include monitoring (whether ambient,68 compli-
ance,69 or effect and effectiveness monitoring70); scientific research and data
generation; information organization and distribution; funding; planning;
standard setting; implementation and permitting; and enforcement.
For many agencies, functional jurisdiction is a subordinate form of reg-
ulatory division. The primary organizing principle for determining the
bounds of such an agency’s authority involves substantive authority, while
the agency’s jurisdiction is secondarily based on function. Typically, an
agency is provided substantive authority over particular resources, issues, or
problems, for which it creates offices or divisions that focus on sub-topics of
that substantive authority. For example, EPA includes Offices for Air and
Radiation, Chemical Safety and Pollution Prevention, Solid Waste and
Emergency Response, and Water, corresponding with its various substantive
authorities to regulate air quality, pesticides and toxic substances, solid and
66 See Timothy P. Duane, Greening the Grid: Implementing Climate Change Policy
Through Energy Efficiency, Renewable Portfolio Standards, and Strategic Transmission Sys-
tem Investments, 34 VT. L. REV. 711, 743–44 (2010).
67 See, e.g., Joseph P. Liu, Regulatory Copyright, 83 N.C. L. REV. 87, 148 (2004). But cf.
Evan Stark, The Battered Mother in the Child Protective Service Caseload: Developing an
Appropriate Response, 23 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 107, 130 (2002) (criticizing New York’s
child protection laws on ground that “[d]omestic violence expertise within the agency is iso-
lated and without substantive authority”).
68 See, e.g., Eric Biber, The Problem of Environmental Monitoring, 83 U. COLO. L. REV.
1, 9 (2011) (detailing problems with ambient monitoring, defined as “the state of the environ-
ment at the local, regional, national, or global scale,” by resource agencies).
69 See, e.g., Availability of a Final Addendum to the Handbook for Habitat Conservation
Planning and Incidental Take Permitting Process, 65 Fed. Reg. 35,241, 35,252-53 (June 1,
2000) (defining compliance monitoring).
70 See, e.g., id. (defining effect and effectiveness monitoring to include whether the action
or plan is achieving its stated goals and objectives).
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hazardous waste, and water quality, respectively.71 These subdivisions often
have authority over a range of functions, including monitoring, standard set-
ting, and implementation/permitting, with authority further subdivided either
by substantive subcategory and/or by functional activity.72
However, agencies also often contain divisions or offices dedicated to
particular regulatory functions, regardless of their substantive focus. At EPA,
these include the Office of Enforcement and Compliance Assurance, the Of-
fice of Environmental Information, the Office of General Counsel, the Of-
fice of Inspector General, the Office of International and Tribal Affairs, and
the Office of Research and Development.73 These offices are charged with
enforcement, gathering information, and research, respectively, across the
entire range of EPA’s substantive authority.74 The Internal Revenue Service
has separate offices to handle tax issues concerning small businesses and
tax-exempt organizations, a substantive division of authority, but it also re-
flects functional divisions, with separate offices for privacy and disclosure,
whistleblowers, and criminal investigations, all of which cut across substan-
tive lines.75 Agencies routinely have separate offices to deal with congres-
sional relations, media and communications, and legal matters, regardless of
the substantive nature of the issue for which negotiations with the legisla-
ture, outreach to the media, or legal advice is required.76 Such division of
functional authority also occurs between agencies. Under the Clean Air Act,
for example, the EPA is charged with developing national ambient air qual-
ity standards to protect the public health and welfare,77 but the states are
primarily responsible for devising plans to implement and achieve those
standards.78
Furthermore, though most regulatory authority is delegated primarily
based on substantive scope, with functional jurisdiction usually a secondary
71 EPA Organizational Structure, http://www.epa.gov/aboutepa/organization.html (last
visited Oct. 6, 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/0HHPzEC3NBG.
72 In 1993, EPA reorganized the Office of Compliance and Enforcement by centralizing in
it enforcement authority previously dispersed among five offices. U.S. Environmental Protec-
tion Agency Office of Environmental Justice in the Matter of the Fifth Meeting of the Environ-
mental Justice Advisory Council, 9 ADMIN. L. REV. AM. U. 623, 663 (1995). This shift
illustrates that the structural relationships among offices within a single agency may differ
along each of the three dimensions identified in this Article, just as relationships may differ
among separate agencies.
73 EPA Organizational Structure, supra note 71. R
74 See Alfred A. Marcus, EPA’s Organizational Structure, 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5,
23 (1991).
75 See IRS Organizational Chart, http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-news/irs_org_chart_2012_.
pdf (last visited Oct. 6, 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/0V8ab6xCvE3.
76 See, e.g., USDA Agencies and Offices, http://www.usda.gov/wps/portal/usda/usdahome?
navid=AGENCIES_OFFICES_C (last visited Oct. 25, 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/
0zM6wTATELX (describing offices within the Department of Agriculture, including the Of-
fice of Communications, the Office of Congressional Relations, and the Office of the General
Counsel).
77 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b) (2006).
78 Id. § 7410(a). EPA may adopt a plan if a state fails to submit an acceptable plan in
limited circumstances. Id. § 7410(c).
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organizing criterion, some agencies are organized with function as the prin-
cipal basis for their authority. For instance, Congress has delegated to the
United States Government Accountability Office responsibility for audit, in-
vestigation, reporting, and evaluation of the federal agencies, regardless of
the substantive area of regulation.79 The United States Geological Survey is a
research-only agency that generates biological, geographical, geological, and
hydrological information that helps inform policy by regulatory authorities,
but has no regulatory functions of its own.80 More broadly, of course, the
separation of legislative, executive, and adjudicative power among the
branches of government is a form of functional jurisdiction.81 As more fully
explored in Part IV, one of the principal aims of this Article is to encourage
policymakers and scholars to focus more attention on whether evaluating
and allocating agency authority along functional rather than substantive lines
holds greater promise of achieving the policy goals of a particular govern-
ment program at less cost to competing policy objectives.
III. A TAXONOMY OF ALLOCATION OF AUTHORITY
For any substantive area of regulation and governmental function, regu-
latory authority can be further evaluated along three key dimensions. As
illustrated in Figure 2, these include how centralized the authority is; how
much overlap in governmental authority there is among multiple government
bodies with concurrent jurisdiction over a particular regulatory problem; and
the extent to which such authority is exercised independently or in coordina-
tion with other governmental entities with authority over a particular sub-
stantive area or function.
As explained in Part IV, some of these dimensions have been ignored
or conflated in the federalism and governance literature. Yet each measures a
particular component of regulatory authority, representing different sets of
policies and ultimately values tradeoffs over the appropriate design for man-
aging social problems. Accordingly, changes in the allocation of authority to
address a regulatory problem may be appropriate along one dimension, but
not others.
79 About GAO, http://www.gao.gov/about/index.html (last visited Oct. 25, 2013), archived
at http://perma.cc/0j8UnhcTXBJ.
80 About USGS, http://www.usgs.gov/aboutusgs/ (last visited Oct. 25, 2013), archived at
http://perma.cc/0hjH13yg1Yi.
81 See, e.g., William W. Buzbee, The Regulatory Fragmentation Continuum, Westway and
the Challenges of Regional Growth, 21 J.L. & POL. 323, 348 (2005) (discussing “institutional
fragmentation,” which results from allocation of authority to “diverse institutions such as leg-
islatures, agencies, courts and legally empowered citizens”).
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Figure 2. Dimension Relationships
A. Decentralized versus Centralized Authority
At least in the legal academic literature, perhaps the most frequently
analyzed dimension for characterizing the allocation of regulatory authority
is the scale or level of government which is granted jurisdiction. As illus-
trated in Figure 3 below, governmental authority could be allocated any-
where in a range between highly centralized and highly decentralized. On
one extreme, a regime may be preemptively federal (e.g., the regulation of
immigration82 or space exploration). On the other end of the spectrum are
regimes where authority is primarily local, such as land use zoning or the
administration of water rights. In between, there is a range of hybrids of
federal, state, and local authority. Some regimes involve various federal
agencies;83 others consist of a federal regulator and single state regulator
82 But cf. Arizona v. U.S., 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2507 (2012) (refusing to enjoin implementa-
tion of state law requiring police to determine the immigration status of persons they stop,
detain, or arrest on some other legitimate basis if “reasonable suspicion exists that the person
is” an unlawful alien).
83 See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (2006) (requiring consultation among federal agencies
on impacts of proposed activities on endangered species); 42 U.S.C. § 7475(d) (2006) (estab-
lishing role for federal land management agencies in EPA review of state disposition of permit
applications for construction of sources whose emissions might affect federal lands such as
national parks).
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whose standards other states can opt to follow;84 still others combine both
federal and state agencies.85
Accordingly, one key question for this dimension is whether authority
to address a social problem is primarily decentralized to a local or state juris-
diction or more centralized at the federal level. Another question, however,
is whether regulatory authority within a certain level is delegated to one
entity or divided among two or more entities. Thus, if a statute allows only
federal agencies to address a problem (preempting supplemental state or lo-
cal regulation), the regime is centralized compared to one in which regula-
tors in all fifty states were allowed to regulate. Within the federal
government, regulatory authority could be fully centralized in one agency or
decentralized by dividing authority among multiple federal agencies or
among local offices of a single federal agency.86 We regard the degree of
fragmentation of authority among multiple regulators at the same level as a
second aspect of characterizing a regulatory regime as centralized or
decentralized.87
1. Decentralized Authority
For centuries, at least as far back as the origination of the concept of
subsidiarity,88 scholars have promoted the idea that authority is best allo-
84 An example is automobile tailpipe emission regulation under the Clean Air Act, which
grants EPA exclusive standard-setting authority, but allows California regulators to set alterna-
tive standards that, if approved by EPA, other state agencies can follow. Clean Air Act, 42
U.S.C. §§ 7507, 7543 (2006).
85 For example, stationary source regulation under the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 7410(a), 7411, 7475(a)(1), 7502(c)(5) (2006), or public land management. See 1 COGGINS
& GLICKSMAN, supra note 60, § 1:1. R
86 An example may best illustrate the point. With some exceptions, the authority to regu-
late federally-owned lands is typically centralized in the federal government. See Robert L.
Fischman, Cooperative Federalism and Natural Resources Law, 14 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 179,
205 (2005) (stating that “[u]sually, the federal government has ultimate authority to make a
preemptive determination” concerning management of natural resources on federal lands). In
those substantive areas in which states retain concurrent jurisdiction, such as wildlife manage-
ment, authority is more decentralized. See 3 COGGINS & GLICKSMAN, supra note 60, § 32:8. If R
Congress had vested federal land management authority in a single federal agency, authority
would have been centralized still further. Instead, jurisdiction to manage different kinds of
federal lands systems (e.g., national parks, national forests, wildlife refuges, and other public
lands) has been delegated to (and decentralized among) a group of agencies, including the
National Park Service, the National Forest Service, the FWS, and the Bureau of Land
Management.
87 Similarly, even if authority is delegated exclusively to one agency, federal or state, that
agency may contain multiple offices, divisions, or bureaus. If so, authority is decentralized
within the agency, and authority among the components within the agency can be overlapping
or distinct, and coordinated or independent. For purposes of this Article, when we refer to a
fully centralized agency, we mean an agency that has no internal subdivisions. We recognize,
however, that subdivisions within an agency may be aligned at different points along the over-
lap and coordination dimensions, just as multiple agencies may be so aligned.
88 Subsidiarity is the organizing principle “that a central authority should have a subsidi-
ary function, performing only those tasks which cannot be performed effectively at a more
immediate or local level.” Subsidiarity, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, http://www.oed.com/
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Figure 3. Centralized versus Decentralized Authority
cated at the local level.89 A popular rationale for decentralized regulation is
its ability to leverage local knowledge and expertise,90 while a related, sec-
ond justification is to ensure regulation is better tailored to local conditions,
preferences, and economic conditions.91 Third, many argue that decentral-
ized government of this first kind allows opportunities for regulatory experi-
mentation that can encourage innovation.92 We refer to these justifications
view/Entry/193007?redirectedFrom=subsidiarity#eid (last visited Oct. 6, 2013), archived at
http://perma.cc/0Vc7ptuKhjD. It is a general principle of European Union law. See Consoli-
dated Version of the Treaty on European Union art. 5(3), Feb. 7 1992, 2010 O.J. (C 83) 13.
89 See Jeffrey S. Dornbos, All (Water) Politics Is Local: A Proposal for Resolving Trans-
boundary Water Disputes, 22 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 17 (2010) (“[T]he Constitution’s
structure of reserving non-enumerated powers to the states suggests a principle of sub-
sidiarity”) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
90 See, e.g., id. at 17. Professor Vermeule distinguishes between “local” and “global”
knowledge, with proponents of decentralized authority tending to prefer context-specific
knowledge about economic or regulatory programs, while advocates of centralized programs
tend to focus on the benefits of a broader “synoptic” approach to regulation. Adrian Vermeule,
Local and Global Knowledge in the Administrative State 2, 18 (Harvard Public Law, Working
Paper No. 13-01, 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2169939. Much as we do in this
Article with respect to the three dimensions we address, Professor Vermeule recognizes that
the distinction between contextual and synoptic knowledge is “highly stylistic, whereas in
reality there is a continuum between the two extremes and everything is a matter of degree.”
Id.
91 See, e.g., Jonathan H. Adler, Jurisdictional Mismatch in Environmental Federalism, 14
N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 130, 136–37 (2005).
92 See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
(“It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may, if
its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments with-
out risk to the rest of the country.”); David L. Markell, States as Innovators: It’s Time for a
New Look to Our “Laboratories of Democracy” in the Effort to Improve Our Approach to
Environmental Regulation, 58 ALB. L. REV. 347, 355 (1994) (describing capacity of state and
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respectively as the expertise, diversity, and experimentation rationales for
decentralized regulation. These three justifications for localizing regulation
are primarily (although not exclusively) based on the pursuit of more effec-
tive regulation.93
A fourth related and commonly purported benefit of decentralized gov-
ernance is that interlocal competition maximizes social utility by allowing
each local community to shape its interests and goals.94 As indicated below,
however, even though some level of decentralization may be a necessary
condition for competition to occur, we think that competition of this kind
flows more precisely from what we define as independently structured gov-
ernment authority than from decentralization.95 Fifth, and finally, some also
argue that localized allocation of authority makes decision-makers more ac-
cessible and therefore promotes more accountable and democratic govern-
ance.96 A related claim postulates that local regulators tend to be more
accountable than regulators at higher government levels.
These justifications explain at least in part the predominance of state or
local regulation of certain social problems. Pre-1960 environmental law is a
good example. Before 1960, state and local laws were the only significant
governmental constraints on pollution in the United States, with a few ex-
ceptions.97 These included state common law causes of action such as nui-
sance, trespass, negligence, and strict liability, as well as local land use
regulations designed to segregate industrial from residential uses, thereby
minimizing opportunities for pollution produced by the former to harm the
latter.98 Other examples of traditional state and local regulation that the Su-
preme Court has identified include matters of health care and protection of
local governments to act as “innovation centers” for environmental regulation by providing
“the opportunity to try a wide variety of approaches simultaneously or within short periods of
time”); Adler, supra note 91, at 137. R
93 Though primarily based on promoting effective regulation, the diversity justification for
decentralization—allowing regulation more closely tailored to local conditions and circum-
stances—can also be justified on equity grounds.
94 See generally Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures. 64 J. POL.
ECON. 416 (1956) (promoting decentralization model premised on interlocal competition for
consumer-voters); ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA (1977) (same). According
to one source, “[u]nder competitive federalism, state and federal governments compete with
one another to provide regulation to a mobile citizenry.” Bruce Johnsen, The Evolution of
Sherman Act Jurisdiction: A Roadmap for Competitive Federalism, 7 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 403,
405 (2004).
95 See infra Part III.C.2.
96 See, e.g., GERALD E. FRUG, CITY MAKING: BUILDING COMMUNITIES WITHOUT BUILDING
WALLS (1999).
97 See The River and Harbors Act of 1899, 33 U.S.C. § 407 (prohibiting the discharge of
“refuse matter” without a federal permit when the program’s principal objective was to pro-
mote commerce by preserving navigability); Robert L. Glicksman, From Cooperative to Inop-
erative Federalism: The Perverse Mutation of Environmental Law and Policy, 41 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 719, 729 (2006) [hereinafter Glicksman, Mutation].
98 Local governments also enacted smoke control ordinances and laws. Glicksman, Muta-
tion, supra note 97, at 729–30. R
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public safety,99 such as regulation of vaccines,100 advertising,101 family and
probate law,102 employee welfare benefit plans,103 protection of the security
of real estate titles,104 insurance contracts,105 education, and enforcement of
criminal laws.106
Though decentralized authority is most likely to be associated with lo-
cal or state regulatory control, federal regulatory authority could be modified
to be more or less decentralized (or fragmented) as well. Some of the same
justifications for local or state regulatory authority may be similarly levied
for delegating jurisdiction over particular substantive areas or regulatory
functions to a variety of disparate federal agencies or local offices within a
single agency. Particularized expertise107 and regulatory experimentation to
promote innovation108 may lead to the allocation of federal authority away
from a heavily consolidated model toward one with more decentralized fed-
eral jurisdiction. These expertise and experimentation rationales tout the ef-
fectiveness advantages of decentralized regulation. The diversity and
accountability rationales for decentralizing regulation to state or local au-
thorities, however, are less relevant to this second aspect of decentralization
because decentralization among multiple federal agencies is not especially
likely to result in either government action that is more tailored to local
conditions or greater accessibility to decisionmakers.
2. Centralized Authority
Despite the diversity, experimentation, democratic, and expertise criti-
ques of centralized government,109 many legislatures and scholars have in-
99 See, e.g., Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 334 (2008); Rush Prudential HMO,
Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355, 387 (2002); Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 237 (2000).
100 See, e.g., Bruesewitz v. Wyeth LLC, 131 S. Ct. 1068, 1096 n.15 (2011).
101 See, e.g., Altria Group, Inc. v. Good, 555 U.S. 70, 77 (2008); Lorillard Tobacco Co. v.
Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 541 (2001).
102 See, e.g., Egelhoff v. Egelhoff ex rel. Breiner, 532 U.S. 141, 151 (2001).
103 See, e.g., California Div. of Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham Const., N.A.,
Inc., 519 U.S. 316, 330 (1997); New York State Conf. of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v.
Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 655–56 (1995).
104 See, e.g., BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 511 U.S. 531, 544 (1994).
105 See, e.g., Metrop. Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 740 (1985).
106 See, e.g., U.S. v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
107 See, e.g., Freeman & Rossi, supra note 4, at 1142 (noting that dispersal of authority can R
“harness the unique expertise and competencies of different agencies,” and that these benefits
may justify resulting policy inconsistencies and wasteful redundancy).
108 See Alejandro E. Camacho, Transforming the Means and Ends of Natural Resources
Management, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1405, 1423 (2011) (noting how decentralized governance can
promote “regulatory experimentation to reduce uncertainty”).
109 See, e.g., Liesbet Hooghe & Gary Marks, Unraveling the Central State, But How?,
POLITICAL SCIENCE SERIES, INSTITUTE FOR ADVANCED STUDIES, VIENNA 6 (2003), available at
http://aei.pitt.edu/530/2/pw_87.pdf (“Centralized government is not well suited to accommo-
date diversity. Ecological conditions may vary from area to area. . . . Preferences of citizens
may also vary sharply across regions within a state, and if one takes such heterogeneity into
account, the optimal level of authority may be lower than economies of scale dictate.”); Dorn-
bos, supra note 89, at 17 (“[O]ver-centralized approaches to environmental regulation are R
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creasingly accepted that at least for some regulatory problems, centralization
makes sense. Centralization can take advantage of economies of scale that
are forfeited if regulatory authority is dispersed.110 Some have argued, for
example, that certain government functions, such as research or standard
setting, should be centralized at the federal level because of the economies
of scale of a single authority administering the function.111 This argument is
premised on the comparatively greater administrative efficiency of central-
ized regulation.
In addition, authority may be best centrally allocated at the federal level
because of the national character of the issues involved or because of collec-
tive action concerns. Some regulatory matters have national footprints that
are best addressed by a federal authority.112 These might include immigration
policy,113 pension plan administration,114 protection of intellectual property
rights,115 protection of union-related advocacy,116 or control of activities on
the high seas,117 such as maritime commerce.118 In environmental law and
other contexts, some harms may cross jurisdictional lines, necessitating more
centralized regulatory control to prevent or manage interstate spillovers.119
Trade wars among the states120 and state product labeling requirements121
have been characterized as other kinds of activity that generate interstate
spillovers that justify centralized federal regulation. Similarly, state public
utility regulators have adopted policies designed to benefit in-state interests
inflexible and do not adequately account for local environmental conditions.”) (citing Adler,
supra note 91, at 137); ENVIRONMENTAL FEDERALISM 259, 263 (Terry L. Anderson & Peter J. R
Hill eds., 1997) (arguing that a centralized approach to environmental justice issues would be
unresponsive to local conditions and needs).
110 O’Connell, supra note 1, at 1680. R
111 See, e.g., Esty, Environmental Federalism, supra note 6, at 614; Esty, Environmental R
Governance, supra note 6, at 1562 (discussing value of economies of scale through consolida- R
tion of scientific or analytic work needed for environmental regulation); Adler, supra note 91, R
at 148.
112 Whether a particular set of issues should be regarded as primarily of national or local
concern may be contested. See, e.g., Ngai Pindell, Nevada’s Residential Real Estate Crisis:
Local Governments and the Use of Eminent Domain to Condemn Mortgage Notes, 13 NEV.
L.J. 888, 900 (2013).
113 See J.B. Ruhl, Climate Change Adaptation and the Structural Transformation of Envi-
ronmental Law, 40 ENVTL. L. 363, 423 (2009).
114 See Boggs v. Boggs, 520 U.S. 833, 838–39 (1997).
115 See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 162 (1989); Sears,
Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 231 (1964).
116 See Chamber of Commerce of U.S. v. Brown, 554 U.S. 60, 76 (2008).
117 See Offshore Logistics, Inc. v. Tallentire, 477 U.S. 207, 233 (1986).
118 See U.S. v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 103 (2000); Foremost Ins. Co. v. Richardson, 457 U.S.
668, 674–75 (1982).
119 Adler, supra note 91, at 139; Richard Stewart, Introduction to ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, R
THE ECONOMY, AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 11 (Richard L. Revesz et al. eds., 2000);
Daniel A. Farber, Climate Adaptation and Federalism: Mapping the Issues, 1 SAN DIEGO J.
CLIMATE & ENERGY L. 259, 266 (2009).
120 See Johnsen, supra note 94, at 449. R
121 See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Regulation, Deregulation, Federalism, and Administrative
Law: Agency Power to Preempt State Regulation, 46 U. PITT. L. REV. 607, 666 (1985).
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at the expense of outsiders.122 In addition, states can export economic bur-
dens to other jurisdictions if they regulate the sale of products that produce
local harms but that are manufactured (and produce employment and eco-
nomic benefits) in other states.123 In these contexts, centralized regulatory
structures may be more effective than decentralized regulation.124
Finally, James Madison and others have argued that centralized regula-
tion has comparative fairness advantages because of its ability to promote
uniform treatment of similarly situated entities regardless of location, and to
temper the ability of self-interested factions to control the levers of power to
the disadvantage of less powerful groups or interests.125
A desire to address collective action problems underlies much of mod-
ern federal environmental law. Much of that law is premised on averting a
“race to the bottom” from decentralized governance, in which local jurisdic-
tions compete with each other by progressively lowering environmental
standards.126 Under this dynamic, individual states have incentives to lower
standards to compete for industry whether or not other states do the same,
even though the states as a collective would be better off not doing so.127
Congress raised the undesirable specter of a race to the bottom when, in
1977, it amended the Clean Air Act.128 A House report warned that “[i]f
there is no Federal policy, States may find themselves forced into a bidding
war to attract new industry by reducing pollution standards.”129 Such a dy-
namic has been noted in other regulatory areas as well.130
122 See generally Amy L. Stein, The Tipping Point of Federalism, 45 CONN. L. REV. 217
(2012).
123 See Robert L. Glicksman & Richard E. Levy, A Collective Action Perspective on Ceil-
ing Preemption by Federal Environmental Regulation: The Case of Global Climate Change,
102 NW. U. L. REV. 579, 599–600 (2008).
124 See Stewart, supra note 6, at 1215 (discussing how interstate “spillover[s] . . . gener- R
ate conflicts and welfare losses not easily remedied under a decentralized regime”).
125 See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 54 (James Madison) (E.H. Scott ed., 1894) (defin-
ing faction as citizens “united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of inter-
est, adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the
community”); Dornbos, supra note 89, at 17 (“[E]nvironmental interests are often under- R
represented at the local level and centralized regulation may . . . ensur[e] that a broad spec-
trum of interests is represented.”).
126 See, e.g., Kirsten Engel, State Environmental Standard-Setting: Is There a “Race” and
Is It “to the Bottom”? 48 HASTINGS L.J. 271 (1997); Peter P. Swire, The Race to Laxity and the
Race to Undesirability: Explaining Failures in Competition Among Jurisdictions in Environ-
mental Law, 14 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 67 (1996).
127 If other states do not lower standards, an individual state is in a better position to attract
industry, while if other states lower standards, then the state must act in a similar manner to
compete effectively.
128 Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91 Stat. 685 (1977).
129 H.R. REP. NO. 95-294, at 152 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1077, 1231. See
also Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Ass’n, 452 U.S. 264, 281–82 (1981)
(characterizing statute regulating coal mining as a response to a congressional finding that
nationwide standards were needed to prevent competition among coal producers in different
states from undermining states’ ability to maintain adequate standards on coal mining opera-
tions within their borders).
130 See, e.g., Cary, supra note 6, at 666 (identifying value of centralized regulation for R
preventing a race to the bottom in shareholder rights against corporations); Lynn LoPucki &
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In some instances, Congress has chosen to centralize authority for only
a particular governmental function, or to centralize authority incrementally
over time on a function-by-function basis, as it did in adopting air and water
pollution control laws. Beginning in the 1950s, the federal government en-
hanced its responsibility for performing certain functions in halting air and
water pollution before others. In 1966, Congress imposed greater centraliza-
tion of information gathering and dissemination through the passage of laws
that funded research into the causes and effects of pollution.131 These laws
reflected the judgment that the states and localities lacked the resources to
engage in or fund the research needed to support the adoption of effective
pollution control laws.132 Armed with the information that federally assisted
research could provide, the states and localities were presumed to be able to
attack pollution and avoid public health effects more effectively.133 In the
1960s, Congress chose to provide technical and financial assistance to the
states, such as by subsidizing the construction of municipal sewage treat-
ment works.134 By the end of the decade, the federal government had in-
creased its role in standard setting in a limited range of situations in which
state and local regulation had been ineffective—namely, the control of inter-
state pollution that the state in which the pollution originated lacked the
incentive to control and that states adversely affected by the pollution lacked
the authority to control.135 Congress subsequently gave EPA and other fed-
eral agencies broad standard-setting authority over a range of environmental
media, including air, water, hazardous and solid waste, pesticides, and other
toxic substances.136
Sara Kalin, The Failure of Public Company Bankruptcies in Delaware and New York: Empiri-
cal Evidence of a “Race to the Bottom,” 54 VAND. L. REV. 231, 266 (2001) (bankruptcy law);
Laurence H. Tribe, The Constitutionality of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act:
Swimming in the Stream of Commerce, 35 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 873, 880 (2012) (health
care for the uninsured); Dan T. Coenen, Originalism and the “Individual Mandate”: Rounding
out the Government’s Case for Constitutionality, 107 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 55, 71 (2012)
(same); Timothy P. Glynn, Interjurisdictional Competition in Enforcing Noncompetition
Agreements: Regulatory Risk Management and the Race to the Bottom, 65 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 1381 (2008); Christopher Paul, Innovation or a Race to the Bottom? Trust “Moderniza-
tion” in New Hampshire, 7 PIERCE L. REV. 353, 372 (2009) (discretionary asset protection
trusts).
131 See, e.g., An Act to Improve, Strengthen, and Accelerate Programs for the Prevention
and Abatement of Air Pollution, Pub. L. No. 88-206, 77 Stat. 392 (1963).
132 See, e.g., Clean Air Act Amendments of 1966, H.R. REP. NO. 89-2170, at 4 (1966),
reprinted in 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3473, 3476; Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments
of 1961, H.R. REP. NO. 87-306, at 5 (1961), reprinted in 1961 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2076, 2079 (“The
need for a much greater Federal research effort was consistently recognized during the hear-
ings on the bill.”).
133 See William L. Andreen, Fables and Federalism: A Re-examination of the Historical
Rationale for Federal Environmental Regulation, 42 ENVTL. L. 627, 653 (2012) (describing
belief that federal funding for air pollution programs would help build state capacity to address
air pollution).
134 Glicksman, Mutation, supra note 97, at 730. R
135 See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 84-1446, at 2 (1955), reprinted in 1955 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3023,
3024 (explaining efforts to “strengthen and extend” the Water Pollution Control Act).
136 See LAZARUS, supra note 5, at 70–73. R
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B. Overlapping versus Distinct Authority
Another important dimension takes the form of a spectrum ranging
from overlapping to distinct regulatory authority. As represented in Figure 4
below, on one extreme, governmental authority over a particular substantive
issue or governmental function may be separate from any other governmen-
tal authority. For the purposes of our analysis, two governmental entities
have overlapping jurisdiction only to the extent that both their substantive
and functional authority intersect and affect each other.137 We do not treat
agencies which share authority to regulate a particular subject matter but
which perform wholly separate functions within that area as agencies with
overlapping authority. Similarly, in federal land management, the USFS
manages designated forests, NPS manages designated parks, and the BLM
manages designated public lands, and in general each agency has little au-
thority over how the others do so.138 On the other end of the spectrum are
regimes in which there are many governmental institutions with considerable
intersecting authority. For instance, the Council on Environmental Quality
(CEQ), NPS, NFS, FWS, and state wildlife and land agencies share authority
over the management of wildlife.139
If regulatory power is fully centralized in one regulator, that power nec-
essarily falls at the distinctness end of this dimension because by definition
overlap requires the existence of at least two regulators. If, however, policy-
makers decide to divide authority among more than one entity, this dimen-
sion implicates two key questions. The first is whether authority over a
particular resource or regulatory problem (e.g., water pollution) should be
divided up so that, even though there are multiple regulators, each is respon-
sible for addressing a distinct component of the larger problem (e.g., one
controls industrial sources and another controls diffuse runoff from agricul-
tural or construction activity, or one controls pollution by non-nuclear mater-
137 Geographically distinct authority provides a straightforward illustration of agencies
with different ranges of substantive authority. For example, each state has sovereign public
trust and police powers (including the authority to manage its public lands and regulate land
use) within its particular geographic boundaries. See, e.g., Carolina Trucks & Equipment, Inc.
v. Volvo Trucks of N. Am., Inc., 492 F.3d 484, 491–92 (4th Cir. 2007) (discussing constraints
on extraterritorial application of the police power). Accordingly, the authority of a municipal-
ity in Australia to regulate land use is effectively distinct from the authority of a municipality
in Maine to do the same, even though both regulate land use.
138 See 1 COGGINS & GLICKSMAN, supra note 60, §§ 2:11–2:14, 6:14–6:18 (discussing the R
various federal lands systems and the jurisdictions of the agencies that manage them).
139 See 3 COGGINS & GLICKSMAN, supra note 60, §§ 32:6–32:17 (discussing jurisdiction of R
federal and state agencies over wildlife on federal lands). CEQ is granted some authority under
the National Environmental Policy Act over information and planning, FWS engages in plan-
ning and standard setting over endangered species pursuant to the Endangered Species Act,
while federal and state land management agencies have planning, implementation, and en-
forcement authority. See generally 2 & 3 COGGINS & GLICKSMAN, supra note 60, ch. 17, 29, R
32.
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Figure 4. Prototypical Examples of Distinct and Overlapping Authority
ials while another has sole authority over nuclear materials).140 The second is
whether regulatory functions should overlap (e.g., if one agency is author-
ized to review and, if appropriate, veto, the issuance of permits by another)
or instead comprise distinct mandates (e.g., if one agency sets standards,
while another applies those standards in the context of resolving individual
permit applications).141 We do not treat authority as overlapping unless two
or more agencies perform the same governmental function within the same
substantive area (e.g., shared enforcement authority between federal and
state regulators for state requirements adopted under delegated federal
authority).
1. Distinct Authority
Legislatures have long adopted and scholars have promoted the idea
that authority over a particular regulatory problem is best allocated to a sin-
gle or few regulators. Such a perspective is primarily based on an explicit or
implicit “matching principle”—that legislatures should match each regula-
tory problem (or aspect of a regulatory problem) to the single authority that
can best address that problem.142 Advocates of the matching principle urge,
140 See, e.g., Robert B. Ahdieh, Dialectical Regulation, 38 CONN. L. REV. 863, 864 (2006)
(discussing jurisdictional overlap, in which agencies have “regulatory authority over the same
individuals or institutions, with regard to the same or related issues”).
141 See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(b), 1342(b) (2006) (delegating standard-setting function
to EPA and permitting function to states meeting certain minimum requirements).
142 See generally HENRY N. BUTLER & JONATHAN R. MACEY, USING FEDERALISM TO IM-
PROVE ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY (1996).
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for example, that environmental regulatory authority generally should be
vested in “the political jurisdiction that comes closest to matching the geo-
graphic area affected by a particular externality.”143
In addition, scholars have identified various weaknesses of a regulatory
system with overlapping regulatory authority. Some criticize overlapping
governance because regulator accountability to the public may be dimin-
ished in a regulatory system where authority intersects.144 Agencies with
shared authority may shirk their responsibilities, blaming co-regulators for
program failures.145 The resulting inaction may unfairly impose risks or costs
on those affected by the unregulated activity that may not occur in jurisdic-
tions in which at least one regulator with shared authority is more conscien-
tious in the exercise of that authority. Others have posited that overlapping
jurisdiction can lead to a lack of finality in the regulatory process.146
One of the more common criticisms of overlapping jurisdiction is that it
is wasteful and inefficient, both for regulators and regulated entities. The
government’s “transaction costs” of regulating increase if multiple agencies
perform tasks that could have been handled by a single agency.147 Efforts to
coordinate among multiple regulators can address redundancy, but can them-
selves be costly.148 Consolidation of authority, therefore, may make sense
within a governmental level. As the proposed reorganization of the six agen-
cies with jurisdiction over small businesses discussed in the introduction to
this Article illustrates, such consolidation is often seen as a way to minimize
redundancy and duplication of effort, thereby promoting administrative
efficiency.149
For regulated entities, multiple bodies of regulation require tracking and
complying with disparate and potentially conflicting sets of obligations.150
Overlapping regulation also can reduce certainty and thus effectiveness if
143 Id. at 48. See also Adler, supra note 91, at 133. R
144 See e.g., Robert A. Schapiro, From Dualist Federalism to Interactive Federalism, 56
EMORY L.J. 1, 17 (2006); Robert A. Schapiro, Monophonic Preemption, 102 NW. U. L. REV.
811, 812–13 (2008); Engel, supra note 7, at 162. R
145 See Freeman & Rossi, supra note 4, at 1187; Todd S. Aagaard, Regulatory Overlap, R
Overlapping Legal Fields, and Statutory Discontinuities, 29 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 237, 288 (2011)
(“Regulatory overlap thus may lead each regulator to shirk . . . within an area of overlapping
jurisdiction.”).
146 Engel, supra note 7, at 162. R
147 Freeman & Rossi, supra note 4, at 1150. Freeman and Rossi cite as an example the R
shared responsibility of the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission in en-
forcing the federal antitrust laws. Id. at 1146. See also Jacob E. Gersen, Overlapping and
Underlapping Jurisdiction in Administrative Law, 2006 SUP. CT. REV. 201, 214 (discussing
duplicative monitoring and enforcement costs).
148 Aagaard, supra note 145, at 288; Vermeule, supra note 90, at 24 (discussing increased R
costs of communication among agencies that accompany the creation of dense networks of
related agencies).
149 See Jason Marisam, Duplicative Delegations, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 181, 184 (2011);
Gersen, supra note 147, at 214. R
150 Marisam, supra note 21, at 223 (stating that such entities would be burdened “more R
than under federal law alone”); Freeman & Rossi, supra note 4, at 1150. R
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the relationships among the mandates of different regulators are unclear.151
Some suggest it would be fundamentally unfair if an entity were regulated
by multiple government bodies and potentially subject to various different
standards.152 Some also claim that overlapping authority can lead to over-
regulation where “numerous regulators are confronted with a more particu-
larized project or proposal with localized and discernible effects.”153 These
scholars consider overlapping authority ineffective “because it may result in
the development of inefficient standards, both through the introduction of
regulatory goals other than externality elimination, and through interference
with the free movement of firms through government overappropriation of
fixed capital assets.”154
Others, however, have asserted that overlapping jurisdiction can lead to
under-regulation, an unintended result of what Professor William Buzbee
has dubbed the creation of a “regulatory commons,”155 especially when the
regulated problem or harm is large-scale and broadly dispersed.156 Buzbee
attributes this to high information costs of developing a regulatory response,
limited credit for regulators, bias toward the regulatory status quo, and regu-
lator risk aversion.157 The result may be that although multiple regulators
have authority to address a particular problem, regulatory gaps develop as
each assumes or hopes that others are addressing it.158 Buzbee suggests that
reducing the number of potential regulators and/or combining the regulatory
authority of particular regulators could lessen the incentives for regulatory
inaction in some contexts.159 Thus, some argue that distinct regulation may
be more effective than overlapping regulation.
Other collective action problems may support distinct regulation. Con-
gress adopted exclusive federal jurisdiction over standard setting for nuclear
waste disposal facilities, transportation of hazardous waste, transportation
and disposal of other forms of nuclear material, and management of bi-
omedical waste based on concerns that state and local governments would
adopt constraints on locally unwanted activities with broader, more diffuse
151 See Ahdieh, supra note 140, at 897. R
152 Cf. Laura E. Little, Empowerment through Restraint: Reverse Preemption or Hybrid
Lawmaking?, 59 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 955, 984 (2009) (referring to the “problems of legal
instability and unfairness resulting from multiple regulations on one wrong”).
153 See Buzbee, supra note 81, at 349. See also James M. Buchanan & Yong J. Yoon, R
Symmetric Tragedies: Commons and Anticommons, 43 J.L. & ECON. 1, 11–12 (2000).
154 Engel, supra note 7, at 165–66. R
155 Buzbee, supra note 7, at 5–6. R
156 See Buzbee, supra note 81, at 348–49 (noting incentives of multiple potential regula- R
tors for regulatory inattention, especially for cross-jurisdictional problems).
157 See William W. Buzbee, State Greenhouse Gas Regulation, Federal Climate Change
Legislation, and the Preemption Sword, 1 SAN DIEGO J. CLIMATE & ENERGY L. 23, 30–36
(2009).
158 Ahdieh, supra note 140, at 897–98 (noting the costs of intersystemic regulation, in- R
cluding shirking, diminished oversight, free-riding, loss of incentives to regulate carefully, and
tendency to blame co-regulators).
159 See Buzbee, supra note 7, at 51. R
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social benefits.160 For example, Congress passed the Low-Level Radioactive
Waste Policy Act of 1980161 to distribute the environmental burdens of the
disposal of nuclear waste more equitably.162
Though obviously related, at least in some cases the centralization and
overlap dimensions do not necessarily present the same choices to policy-
makers, and moves along the two dimensions may have different effects on
regulatory authority. Typically, a centralization of substantive regulatory
power results in a decrease in overlap. Federal deregulation that provides for
unitary state regulation would decrease overlap in authority, just as federal
ceiling preemption of state law (under which state governments are barred
from regulating more stringently than the federal government)163 would. For
example, in addition to being a shift toward centralization, the creation of
certain federal authority over automobile tailpipe emission standards,164 pes-
ticides,165 and nuclear waste166 each represented movement away from over-
lap by preempting supplemental state standards, even if those standards were
more stringent than the federal standards.
On the other hand, a federal law establishing a new federal agency with
only floor preemption authority—under which state authorities may adopt
more stringent regulation than their federal counterpart—would result in an
increase in centralization as well as overlap.167 Moreover, decreases or in-
creases in overlap may occur not only over substantive jurisdiction but also
over particular regulatory functions. For example, increasing limitations on
or barring the authority of federal agencies to overfile—to commence en-
forcement action against permit holders in addition to state agency enforce-
ment168—would decrease overlap in enforcement functions.169
160 See, e.g., 49 U.S.C. § 5125 (2006) (preempting some state regulation of hazardous
waste packaging and transportation); Tennessee v. United States Dep’t of Transp., 326 F.3d
729, 730–31 (6th Cir. 2003) (describing federal hazardous materials transportation legislation
as “an effort to create a coherent approach to . . . problems posed by the interstate transporta-
tion of hazardous material”).
161 42 U.S.C. §§ 2021b–2021d (2006).
162 See Glicksman & Levy, supra note 123, at 600–01. R
163 See William W. Buzbee, Asymmetrical Regulation: Risk, Preemption, and the Floor/
Ceiling Distinction, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1547, 1555 (2007) (discussing arguments for and
against ceiling or “unitary federal choice” preemption that “eliminates institutional
diversity”).
164 See 42 U.S.C. § 7543 (2006) (generally prohibiting the adoption or enforcement of
state tailpipe emission standards, but allowing EPA to waive prohibition by granting a waiver
to California).
165 See 7 U.S.C. § 136v(b) (2006) (preempting state regulation of labeling and packaging
of pesticide products).
166 See 49 U.S.C. § 5125 (2006).
167 Thus, many of the federal pollution statutes provide for floor preemption, retaining
state authority to adopt regulations that are more stringent than their federal counterparts. See,
e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1370 (2006); 42 U.S.C. § 7416 (2006).
168 See infra note 271 and accompanying text (discussing the advantages and disadvan- R
tages of overlapping enforcement authority).
169 Similarly, in adopting the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, Congress chose to preempt all
state regulation of the manner in which nuclear power plants operate, but to retain state author-
ity to decide whether to bar issuance of operating permits based on economic reasons (such as
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2. Overlapping Authority
Overlapping authority has its proponents. A large and growing litera-
ture identifies a variety of effectiveness and accountability benefits associ-
ated with a regulatory system with concurrent regulatory authority. Some
scholars have reasoned that an approach that minimizes overlap and consoli-
dates decision making in a single or few authorities can have a number of
negative consequences. In addition to pointing to the implausibility of elimi-
nating already extensive regulatory segmentation,170 many scholars have de-
tailed the undesirability of doing so.171
Some scholars argue that the redundancy that occurs through overlap-
ping jurisdiction can be advantageous.172 Though much of this literature re-
lates to allocation of authority between the federal government and the states
and localities,173 the same dynamic applies to overlap within a particular
level of government. To begin with, although overlap can create inefficien-
cies, as described above,174 it can enhance the prospects for effective regula-
tion. The key idea is that concurrent jurisdiction increases the likelihood of
regulatory action because there are more actors with authority to regulate.175
Should one regulatory entity backslide or fail to regulate, others would be
available to fill the gap.176 Concurrent jurisdiction thus may be particularly
valuable for regulatory contexts177 where the costs of under-regulation are
high, such as those that seek to address high-cost or irreversible effects or
the affordability of the energy produced by nuclear plants). Pacific Gas and Elec. Co. v. State
Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm’n, 461 U.S. 190 (1983).
170 See Buzbee, supra note 7, at 51. R
171 See, e.g., Ruhl & Salzman, supra note 7; see Buzbee, supra note 7, at 51; see Adelman R
& Engel, supra note 7, at 1800–01. R
172 Jared Snyder & Jonathan Binder, The Changing Climate of Cooperative Federalism:
The Dynamic Role of the States in A National Strategy to Combat Climate Change, 27 UCLA
J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 231, 252 (2009).
173 See, e.g., Blake Hudson, Reconstituting Land-Use Federalism to Address Transitory
and Perpetual Disasters: The Bimodal Federalism Framework, 2011 BYU L. REV. 1991, 2037
(2011).
174 See supra notes 147–149 and accompanying text. R
175 Buzbee, supra note 157, at 53. R
176 See Freeman & Rossi, supra note 4, at 1138 (arguing that redundancy provides insur- R
ance against a single agency’s failure); Benjamin Ewing & Douglas A. Kysar, Prods and
Pleas: Limited Government in an Era of Unlimited Harm, 121 YALE L.J. 350, 354 (2011)
(arguing that overlap “opens space” for each regulator “to prod and plea with one another
when the danger . . . is one of government underreach”); Michael Doran, Legislative Organi-
zation and Administrative Redundancy, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1815, 1819 (2011) (arguing that re-
dundancy can “provid[e] an important failsafe”).
177 Professor Biber has argued that the desirable amount of overlap is likely to be highly
contextual, depending on factors such as whether the agencies concerned have goals that are
complementary or in tension with one other, the cultures and professional backgrounds of
agencies and their personnel, and the political context. See Biber, supra note 52, at 80. The R
location of the relevant agencies along the other dimensions identified in this article is also
likely to be important, such as whether the agencies have cooperative or competitive
relationships.
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the management of nonrenewable resources.178 Relatedly, concurrent juris-
diction has the potential to improve decisions and enhance the effectiveness
of government programs by allowing authorities with a range of different
competencies to be brought to bear on a problem.179
The regulatory safety net resulting from overlap also can foster ac-
countability by indirectly combating interest group capture that may exist for
one governmental entity but not another.180 As Anne Joseph O’Connell has
noted, “[o]ne interest group generally will find it more difficult to capture
several agencies than a single agency; to wield power over multiple agen-
cies, interest groups may have to work together, which is a costly enterprise
for the groups.”181 In addition, agencies with overlapping subject matter and
functional jurisdiction may be more reluctant to respond favorably to interest
group pressure because other agencies sharing regulatory authority may de-
tect and cast adverse light on that behavior.182
Both distinct and overlapping authority, therefore, have the potential to
enhance accountability, depending on the circumstances and incentives of
regulators. Distinct authority is better situated to promote accountability if
the primary accountability problem is the tendency of co-regulators to shirk
their responsibilities and to blame co-regulators for program failures.183 On
the other hand, overlapping authority is better designed to promote accounta-
bility if one co-regulator’s likely response to another’s lack of regulation is
not to assign blame, but instead to step into the regulatory breach, or if cap-
ture is a prominent concern. Which account is more compelling to policy-
makers may depend on assessments of the history of the particular
regulatory program and social problem in question, and policymakers’ phi-
losophies about institutional incentives and behavior.184
Some also argue that overlapping authority may provide space for ini-
tial regulatory strategies by one entity that can serve as a proving ground.185
These commenters contend that a dispersed and overlapping regulatory sys-
tem, such as the delegation of authority to the states allowing the adoption of
pollution controls more stringent than federal standards,186 may allow for a
178 See Engel, supra note 7, at 179; see also Ewing & Kysar, supra note 176, at 410 R
(“Overlapping governance mechanisms . . . ensure a fuller and more inclusive characterization
of emerging threats to social and environmental well-being.”).
179 Alejandro E. Camacho, Adapting Governance to Climate Change: Managing Uncer-
tainty Through a Learning Infrastructure, 59 EMORY L.J. 1, 67–68 (2009).
180 See Engel, supra note 7, at 178–79 (noting that overlap can combat excessive influence R
of interest groups that prevents effective regulation).
181 O’Connell, supra note 1, at 1677. Likewise, agencies with broader jurisdiction are R
harder to capture than agencies with narrower ones because “all of the covered industries must
bid against one another to capture the regulator.” Hyman & Kovacic, supra note 58, at 19. R
182 See Aagaard, supra note 145, at 294. R
183 See Freeman & Rossi, supra note 4, at 1187. R
184 Id. at 1157.
185 See Carlson, supra note 7, at 1100–01. R
186 The Clean Air Act, for example, authorizes EPA to adopt technology-based emission
controls for certain sources and pollutants, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7411–12 (2006), but it allows states to
adopt more stringent emission control standards in most areas. Id. at § 7416.
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diversity of tailored approaches, promoting innovative management experi-
mentation and creating the opportunity for learning about the advantages and
disadvantages of particular management strategies.187 According to these
scholars, concurrent authority can promote innovation by providing regula-
tors close access to information about the efficacy of alternative manage-
ment strategies based on their observations of the experience of co-
regulators.188 As detailed in Part IV, however, these arguments touting the
diversity benefits of overlapping jurisdiction appear to be erroneously con-
flating it with decentralized authority.189
C. Independent versus Coordinated Authority
A final dimension for characterizing the allocation of authority focuses
on the extent of formal or informal coordination among authorities with ju-
risdiction over a particular regulatory problem or government function. For
this dimension, the key question is how much multiple regulatory authorities
communicate, coordinate, and collaborate in addressing any particular sub-
stantive problem or in performing a delegated governmental function. As
illustrated in Figure 5, on one end of the spectrum190 is a regulatory frame-
work in which governmental entities are highly independent and isolated in
their regulatory activities. At the other end is a regulatory relationship char-
acterized by close agency collaboration and regulatory coordination. This
dimension assumes some level of decentralization because if there is only
one regulator there is no other entity with which to coordinate its actions.191
It may come into play whether or not there is jurisdictional overlap among
authorities, and, if so, whether that overlap is substantive and/or functional.
Coordination among agencies with distinct jurisdictional charges is possible,
just as it is among those with overlapping responsibilities. For example, two
agencies might seek to coordinate efforts to address the risks posed by expo-
sure to asbestos, even if one agency is responsible for controlling asbestos
emissions from factory smokestacks and another regulates the use of asbes-
tos in brake linings. The two agencies could agree that their regulations
should limit human exposure to a certain level of acceptable health risk.
187 See Adelman & Engel, supra note 7, at 1820–21; Ahdieh, supra note 140, at 892. R
188 Engel, supra note 7, at 177 (noting that “regulatory activity at one level . . . may be a R
stepping stone to regulation at the governing level that dual federalism proponents label
‘optimal’”).
189 See infra notes 301–310 and accompanying text. R
190 It is more difficult to conceptualize the coordination-independence dimension as a sim-
ple spectrum ranging from greater to lesser degrees of coordination because coordination can
be measured in different ways, including the frequency, duration, scope, and voluntariness of
coordination. It is typically simpler to determine with respect to a given substantive area or
government function whether the authority to address that area or function is centralized or
decentralized, or distinct or overlapping. See infra notes 213–221 and accompanying text. R
191 If regulatory power is concentrated in one entity, the issue of whether that authority
should be exercised in independent or coordinated fashion is moot (although the degree of
coordination among employees or offices within a single agency can differ).
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Alternatively, they could coordinate by doing joint research on the degree of
health risks posed at different levels of exposure, and then make independent
decisions on what degree of risk to regulate.
Figure 5. Independent versus Coordinated Authority
1. Coordinated Authority
In response to the considerable incentives and effects of regulatory
fragmentation, some scholars and regulatory actors have called for more co-
ordination among regulatory authorities. Indeed, coordination exists or has
been proposed over a wide range of substantive jurisdictions, such as natural
resources,192 food safety,193 and bioterrorism.194 Though eliminating fragmen-
192 Many inter-jurisdictional natural resource management coordination regimes have been
created. See, e.g., California Bay-Delta Authority (CBDA), CALIFORNIA BAY-DELTA PROGRAM
ARCHIVED WEBSITE, http://calwater.ca.gov/calfed/oversight/CBDA/index.html (last visited Oc-
tober 25, 2011), archived at http://perma.cc/0aFjAMMjkUF; see also Bradley C. Karkkainen,
Collaborative Ecosystem Governance: Scale, Complexity, and Dynamism, 21 VA. ENVTL. L.J.
189, 217–18 (2002).
193 See, e.g., FDA Food Safety Modernization Act, Pub. L. No. 111-353, 124 Stat. 3885,
§421(d) (2011) (requiring the Departments of Homeland Security, Health and Human Ser-
vices, Agriculture, Commerce, and EPA to coordinate in information collection, analysis, and
reporting on foodborne illnesses, outbreak response planning, and technical assistance to local
governments).
194 See, e.g., Drinking Water Security and Safety Amendments, adopted as part of the
Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002, Pub. L. No.
107–188 §§ 401–03, 116 Stat. 594, 682–87 (2002) (requiring coordination, led by EPA, to
abate and respond to threats to drinking water infrastructure security). See generally Steven D.
Shermer, The Drinking Water Security and Safety Amendments of 2002: Is America’s Drinking
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tation or overlap may be implausible or even undesirable, many scholars
have emphasized the value of agency dialogue and collaboration to reduce
fragmentation’s adverse effects.195 Coordination can increase the effective-
ness of government action by promoting exchanges of ideas and the pooling
of the expertise of different agencies.196 Although efforts to coordinate re-
quire the investment of time and resources that need not be incurred when
agencies act independently, some claim that these costs may be more than
offset by reductions in duplication of effort and inconsistent action, so that
coordination can result in a net administrative efficiency gain.197
Scholars also argue that coordination can promote accountability by
combating drift,198 shirking,199 and free-riding through facilitation of inter-
agency monitoring.200 Coordination also can promote accountability by pro-
viding governmental authorities the opportunity and even the duty to review
and serve as a check on other authorities in the performance of delegated
governmental functions, thereby reducing the risk of regulator capture.201
Each regulatory authority can essentially serve as an accountability check on
the others.202 Finally, the coordinated exercise of multi-jurisdictional author-
ity can promote fairness by minimizing the imposition of inconsistent or
redundant demands on regulated entities.203
Water Infrastructure Safer Four Years Later?, 24 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 355, 395–96
(2006).
195 See, e.g., EUGENE BARDACH, GETTING AGENCIES TO WORK TOGETHER: THE PRACTICE
AND THEORY OF MANAGERIAL CRAFTSMANSHIP (1998) (providing recommendations for foster-
ing interagency collaboration); Ruhl & Salzman, supra note 7, at 66 (discussing a system of R
“weak ties” for alleviating the effects of fragmentation).
196 See Freeman & Rossi, supra note 4, at 1184 (noting potential for coordination to im- R
prove decision making by adding data and expertise and diversifying perspectives).
197 See id. at 1183.
198 See id. at 1187 (“In traditional principal-agent theory, whenever Congress delegates
authority to an agency, the delegation inevitably provides the agency with discretion, which
creates a risk of drift away from the preferences of the lawmakers who enacted the
delegation.”).
199 See id. at 1187–88 (defining shirking as a form of drift that involves inaction). Shirking
is often driven by the hope that another regulator will address a problem, relieving the shirker
of the need to do so. See, e.g., William W. Buzbee, Urban Sprawl, Federalism, and the Prob-
lem of Institutional Complexity, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 57, 131 (1999) (referring to the incen-
tives of localities within a metropolitan region “to shirk and let others provide essential
amenities”).
200 See Freeman & Rossi, supra note 4, at 1189 (noting that coordination can “control drift R
by providing structured opportunities for agencies to account to each other”).
201 See id. at 1186 (“[A]gencies are harder to isolate and neutralize to the extent that their
approaches are . . . aligned.”).
202 Affording government officials access to information on the performance of other reg-
ulators can provide increased capacity to pressure those other regulators to comply with regu-
latory requirements. See Camacho, supra note 179, at 74–75. R
203 Cf. Thomas McInerney, Putting Regulation Before Responsibility: Towards Binding
Norms of Corporate Social Responsibility, 40 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 171, 195 (2007) (discussing
“efforts of [African] state regulators to coordinate their regulatory approaches and ensure
equitable treatment in international negotiations . . . ”); Maribeth Wilt-Seibert, Unemployment
Compensation for Employees of Educational Institutions: How State Courts Have Created
Variations on Federally Mandated Statutory Language, 29 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 585, 611
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Recently, a number of scholars and government officials have ex-
amined the various characteristics of interagency coordination.204 For several
reasons, its definition is unsettled. Different schools of organizational theory
seek to explain institutional coordination, and each of their definitions differ
from one another.205 In addition, coordination can take any number of forms.
Coordination can be formal or informal.206 It can be long or short-term,207
and frequent or occasional.208 Coordination can be voluntary and coopera-
tive,209 or mandated by legislative or executive action.210 The National Envi-
ronmental Policy Act,211 discussed below,212 is a prominent example of
mandated, formal federal interagency coordination, but primarily only over
agency planning and information-gathering functions.
Coordination also can be understood as a spectrum that ranges from
less active inter-jurisdictional relationships to those that require significant
synchronization.213 The range of coordination activities includes mere com-
(1995) (encouraging coordination among states to ensure consistency and equitable treatment
of similarly situated employees with respect to unemployment compensation benefits).
204 See generally Freeman & Rossi, supra note 4; Bradley, supra note 8; DeShazo & R
Freeman, supra note 7. R
205 Gregg Macey, Environmental Crisis and the Paradox of Organizing, 2011 BYU L.
REV. 2063, 2113 (2011) (discussing different definitions of interorganizational coordination in
game theory, resource exchange, contingency theory, and transaction cost economics).
206 See Freeman & Rossi, supra note 4, at 1156 (describing the presence of considerable R
informal coordination that may or may not involve explicit communication between agencies).
See also Vermeule, supra note 90, at 22 (referring to “myriad” devices and mechanisms for R
achieving coordination, ranging from conversations to formal interagency memoranda of
agreement); Hyman & Kovacic, supra note 58, at 29 (same). R
207 See, e.g., Alejandro E. Camacho, Community Benefits Agreements: A Symptom, Not
the Antidote, of Bilateral Land Use Regulation, 78 BROOK. L. REV. 355, 364 (2013) (referring
to long-term collaboration among community members on land use matters); Jesse Hahnel
Caroline Van Zile, The Other Achievement Gap: Court-Defendant Youth and Educational Ad-
vocacy, 41 J.L. & EDUC. 435, 473 (2012) (discussing long-term collaboration among child
welfare agencies, education agencies, and juvenile court systems in promoting child welfare);
Bryan McDonald, Book Review Making Collaboration Work: Lessons from Innovation in Nat-
ural Resources Management, 4 NAT. RESOURCES J. 1033, 1033 (2001) (“Collaborations could
be short term or long term and involve a single area or issue or interactions among regions or
ecosystems.”).
208 Charlene D. Luke, The Relevance Games: Congress’s Choices for Economic Substance
Gamemakers, 66 TAX LAW. 551, 553 n.7 (2013) (discussing frequent collaboration among
federal agencies responsible for enforcing the Internal Revenue Code).
209 See CRAIG W. THOMAS, BUREAUCRATIC LANDSCAPES: INTERAGENCY COOPERATION
AND THE PRESERVATION OF BIODIVERSITY 24 (2003) (describing non-mandatory interagency
cooperation). Professor Marisam has identified three kinds of benefits that agencies may de-
rive from cooperation with other agencies: the power they derive from influencing other agen-
cies’ actions, the reputational benefits that may flow from contributing to the solution to
another agency’s problem, and reciprocation from other agencies in the future. Marisam, supra
note 21, at 7. R
210 See Freeman & Rossi, supra note 4, at 1157. R
211 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–4370h (2006).
212 See infra Part IV.A.3.
213 See Bradley, supra note 8, at 757–58 (describing spectrum of interagency coordination, R
including advisory, mandated interaction, veto power, and lobbying power).
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munication of adopted agency actions;214 creation of formal or informal fora
for inter-jurisdictional discussion;215 providing to other governmental author-
ities an opportunity to comment on or respond to potential or proposed
agency actions, whether discretionary216 or mandatory;217 required considera-
tion of or response to the comments or recommendations of other govern-
mental authorities;218 the harmonization of agency activities through voting
arrangements or mutual/consensus agreement;219 and providing a govern-
mental authority a de facto or express veto power over the activity of another
authority.220 Of course, even each of these types of coordination can vary
considerably. For example, inter-jurisdictional agreements can range in
scope, strength, and duration.221
Because of this multiplicity of factors, it may at times be challenging to
characterize one regulatory program as more or less coordinated as another.
To be sure, infrequent and short-term communication typically would be less
coordinated than continued and enduring interaction; cooperation on a few
issues ordinarily involves less coordination than cooperation on many issues;
and voluntary discussion between agencies usually would be less coordi-
nated than mandatory consultation. However, in some circumstances these
various factors may point in different directions. For example, voluntary
214 Publication of public notices by government agencies in the Federal Register may be
the most recognizable example at the federal level.
215 Formal examples of these include some functions of federal interagency task forces
such as the Interagency Climate Change Adaptation Task Force (http://www.whitehouse.gov/
administration/eop/ceq/initiatives/adaptation, archived at http://perma.cc/0izpgFeDBJw), or
the National Endowment for the Arts Federal Interagency Task Force (http://www.nea.gov/
news/news11/Task-Force-Announcement.html, archived at http://perma.cc/0zcvEu6gvm7).
216 See Freeman & Rossi, supra note 4, at 1157 (describing “discretionary consultation”). R
For example, the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act provides that when con-
sidering applications for pesticide registration, EPA “may consult” with any other federal
agency.
217 See id.; Bradley, supra note 8, at 750–56 (discussing examples of mandatory agency R
consultation requirements); Biber, supra note 8, at 41–60 (same). R
218 See Bradley, supra note 8, at 755 (describing how the Federal Power Act requires R
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission to consider input from fish and wildlife agencies
before approving plans to construct new hydroelectric dams); Freeman & Rossi, supra note 4, R
at 1158 (citing EPA’s duty under federal pesticide laws to solicit opinions from Departments of
Agriculture and Health and Human Services before promulgating regulations).
219 Some international treaties or interstate compacts, such as those that help govern use of
the Colorado River, exemplify relatively robust forms of harmonization over standard setting.
See, e.g., Colorado River Compact of 1922, 70 CONG. REC. 324 (1928); Upper Colorado River
Basin Compact, ch. 48, 63 Stat. 31 (1949). Other versions focus primarily on the information-
gathering function. See, e.g., Great Lakes Basin Compact, Pub. L. No. 90-419, 82 Stat. 414,
415–17 (1968) (establishing the Great Lakes Commission to gather information and make non-
binding recommendations to member states).
220 See Bradley, supra note 8, at 755–56 (discussing de facto veto and express veto R
powers).
221 THOMAS, supra note 209, at 25 (“[S]pecific cooperative agreements should be mea- R
sured in terms of their scope, strength, and duration, not simply their existence. Scope refers to
the range of issues covered. . . . Strength refers to the binding nature of the agreements, rang-
ing from verbal or tacit agreements to legally binding documents. Duration refers to the endur-
ance of an agreement.”).
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLL\51-1\HLL102.txt unknown Seq: 40 30-JAN-14 8:00
58 Harvard Journal on Legislation [Vol. 51
weekly meetings between agencies to discuss issues of common concern
may be considered more or less coordinated than a program that requires an
agency to solicit and integrate comments from another agency annually.
Similarly, a short-term inter-jurisdictional agreement involving a wide range
of problems may be more or less coordinated than a long-term one on a
narrow issue. For purposes of this Article, however, we do not seek to devise
a formula weighing these various factors for calculating where a particular
government program rests along the coordination/independence dimension.
Instead, our point is that policymakers should consider whether the goals of
a decentralized regime, whether distinct or overlapping, would best be pro-
moted by requiring coordination or allowing independent exercise of author-
ity. Part of that assessment, of course, will entail consideration of various
forms of coordination, each of which will have its own set of costs and
benefits.
2. Independent Authority
Although coordination of regulatory efforts has theoretical effective-
ness and administrative efficiency advantages, many of the calls for collabo-
ration and the formation of coordinating regimes are reflexive, without any
additional discussion of the costs of such additional regimes. Adding layers
of consultation and collaboration requirements to an overlapping regulatory
landscape will undoubtedly divert already limited agency resources, and it is
worth considering whether the benefits of particular communications or col-
laborations among authorities are worth these opportunity costs. Particularly
if they are not designed properly, efforts at collaboration may not be worth
the cost.222 In the past, at least some inter-jurisdictional collaborations have
failed to provide meaningful opportunities for cross-jurisdictional informa-
tion sharing and collaboration.223
Moreover, close agency coordination may impair regulatory effective-
ness, particularly in the management of complex and uncertain regulatory
problems. In discussing the benefits of divided regulatory authority, numer-
ous scholars have focused on the value of inter-jurisdictional competition in
promoting socially optimal environmental regulation. Richard Revesz ar-
gued in an influential article that interstate competition for industry should
produce “an efficient allocation of industrial activity among the states.”224
222 Freeman & Rossi, supra note 4, at 1182 (noting substantial “up-front investments re- R
quired to coordinate agencies,” and that giving one agency veto power may elevate costs
substantially by requiring extensive negotiations).
223 See Camacho, supra note 179, at 30–36 (analyzing inter-jurisdictional collaborations R
for managing resources in the Great Lakes and criticizing these efforts as serving as “yet
another layer of fragmentation to the already disjointed regulatory landscape”).
224 Revesz, supra note 6, at 1211–12. See also Nestor M. Davidson, Cooperative Local- R
ism: Federal-Local Collaboration in an Era of State Sovereignty, 93 VA. L. REV. 959, 961
(2007) (discussing how the Supreme Court’s modern federalism jurisprudence “privileges state
sovereignty in order to promote efficiency and intergovernmental competition.”).
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Jonathan Adler argues that inter-jurisdictional competition “can encourage
policy innovation as policymakers seek to meet the economic, environmen-
tal, and other demands of their constituents,” while allowing competing au-
thorities “to act as environmental ‘laboratories’ developing new and
improved ways of addressing environmental concerns.”225 Competition
among authorities may be a contest for political credit, resources, or addi-
tional regulatory responsibilities. Such competition is premised on the regu-
latory autonomy and independence of individual regulators from the
activities of other government authorities. Though these competition benefits
are often ascribed as a feature of decentralization,226 it is the fact that regula-
tors are acting independently rather than in a coordinated fashion that yields
the competitive dynamic.
In addition, some forms of coordination may lead to an “anti-com-
mons” problem.227 The most acute forms of coordination, such as required
harmonization of agency activities, include requiring all governmental au-
thorities with jurisdiction over a particular problem to agree to a particular
regulatory strategy.228 Some scholars have argued that a consensus decision
rule can encourage holdouts and mutual vetoes that can result in the underu-
tilization of resources because regulatory action viewed as beneficial by
most co-regulators is blocked by a lone holdout.229
Though arguments promoting regulatory independence are typically
raised in conjunction with arguments promoting the devolution of regulatory
authority to localities or states,230 regulatory independence can be valuable
even among federal agencies. In the context of analyzing the possible reor-
ganization of the governmental provision of national security intelligence,
Professor Anne Joseph O’Connell has argued that competition among even
federal authorities in some instances may be preferable to coordination be-
cause it may prevent “pernicious” collusion, encourage a creative “race to
the top,” motivate correction of other agencies’ mistakes, and facilitate adap-
tation to changing conditions.231
225 Adler, supra note 91, at 134. R
226 See, e.g., Cohen et al., supra note 1, at 710–11 (noting that centralization can diminish R
inter-agency competition and prevent efficient performance).
227 See generally Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the
Transition from Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621, 622–26 (1998). An anti-commons
regime is one “that requires everybody’s consent to achieve socially beneficial outcomes.” See
also Eyal Benvenisti, Sovereign and Trustees for Humanity: On the Accountability of States to
Foreign Stakeholders, 107 AM. J. INT’L L. 295, 312 (2013).
228 See supra notes 217–223 and accompanying text. R
229 See, e.g., Hanoch Dagan & Michael A. Heller, The Liberal Commons, 110 YALE L.J.
549, 590 (2001); Heller, supra note 227, at 622–26. R
230 See, e.g., Carlson, supra note 7, at 1102. R
231 O’Connell, supra note 1, at 1677–78. Professor O’Connell provides the following R
example:
[I]f multiple intelligence agencies are tasked with finding Osama bin Laden, the
competition to find him might motivate each agency to achieve more than it would if
it were the only agency working to achieve that objective. In addition, such competi-
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In addition, O’Connell asserts that providing multiple governmental en-
tities with regulatory authority over a particular problem can help prevent
“group think”232 and increase the diversity of viewpoints.233 Any such bene-
fits result from the existence of multiple governmental authorities acting au-
tonomously. Finally, assuming alternative mechanisms for obtaining
information about the performance of other regulators, inter-jurisdictional
competition also may serve as a source of accountability. Regulators may
have substantial incentives to vigilantly review and challenge the actions of
other intersecting authorities,234 particularly when there are inter-jurisdic-
tional spillovers or attempts by an authority to obtain a competitive
advantage.
As in the case of the distinctness/overlap dimension,235 proponents of
both coordination and independence have identified accountability benefits.
Both accounts note the potential for one agency armed with information
about what others are doing to serve as a check on the failures of co-regula-
tors. Whether one finds one account or the other more convincing in a spe-
cific context may turn on a number of factors, including the particular
governmental function at issue.236 It may also depend on whether this check-
ing function is best promoted by the relatively greater access to information
about the activities of co-regulators among coordinating agencies, or by the
potentially greater willingness of competing, as opposed to coordinating,
agencies to call other agencies to account for drift, shirking, capture, or other
forms of regulatory failure.
In some circumstances, then, maintaining agency independence and
limiting cooperation may be more important for managing certain regulatory
problems than a heavily collaborative model. Most prominently, depending
on the governmental function at issue, regulator independence may be more
consistent with—and may better promote—the redundancy benefits of over-
lapping jurisdiction than a heavily coordinated model. Such a circumstance
tion may “make it easier for the organization[s] to adapt to a changing
environment.”
Id. at 1167–68 (citations omitted).
232 See IRVING JANIS, VICTIMS OF GROUPTHINK 8–9 (1972) (coining the term “groupthink”
as a product of cohesive ingroups “when the members’ strivings for unanimity override their
motivation to realistically appraise alternative courses of action”); Susan Cain, The Rise of the
New Groupthink, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15, 2012 (citing research showing that brainstorming ses-
sions do not stimulate creativity).
233 O’Connell, supra note 1, at 1676. Though Professor O’Connell focuses on this as a R
benefit of regulatory redundancy, it is more properly understood as a feature of whether the
applicable regulators are independent from each other.
234 Cf. Engel, supra note 7, at 178–79 (discussing how intersecting agencies can promote R
accountability by monitoring each other’s compliance).
235 See supra Part III.B.
236 Coordinated information gathering, for example, may allow co-regulators to stretch
their resources farther than they could acting independently. If so, a shared information base
among those regulators may foster experimentation if each acts independently in putting that
information to use, such as in planning or standard setting.
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might exist during periods of change,237 when there is considerable uncer-
tainty, harm may be catastrophic, and prevention or mitigation of such harm
by one of the independent authorities is possible.238
IV. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF FUNCTIONAL JURISDICTION AND THE
DIMENSIONS OF GOVERNMENT AUTHORITY
As one scholar has noted, “arguing that lines of organization are en-
tirely inconsequential is likely to be as difficult as arguing that lines of geo-
graphic jurisdiction are inconsequential.”239 A variety of academic
disciplines suggest “that formal lines of authority, jurisdictional limits, and
formal hierarchical arrangements should be expected to change how legal
mandates are carried out.”240 This Article focuses on two aspects of agency
institutional structure that we believe have not been fully appreciated in the
literature: (1) the role of functional jurisdiction in allocating agency author-
ity, introduced in Part II, and (2) the existence of, and relationships among,
three different dimensions of governmental authority, introduced in Part III.
Section A, below, documents the neglect of functional jurisdiction in
both academic and political considerations of agency structure, and illus-
trates why it is important to differentiate between substantive and functional
jurisdiction in allocating government authority. Section B substantiates the
tendency of policymakers and scholars to conflate the three dimensions of
authority, and analyzes how the failure to fully appreciate the effects of allo-
cating authority along each of the dimensions may defeat the goals of gov-
ernment programs or prevent them from realizing their full potential. By
choosing to structure the exercise of various functions at a different point
along each of the three dimensions, it may be possible for policymakers to
harness the advantages of certain dimensions when they are particularly
prominent for certain governmental functions, while minimizing the short-
comings when they exist for others. Part V provides some tentative recom-
mendations for fully integrating functional and dimensional considerations
into the analysis of government structure.
A. The Importance of Appreciating Functional Jurisdiction
The literature on government organization and structure is rich. A few
commenters have noted problems with organizing administrative agencies
237 Ahdieh, supra note 140, at 890 (arguing for “intersystemic regulation” that minimizes R
inertia and promotes regulatory competition and learning, especially “amidst transition.”).
238 Cf. Marisam, supra note 21, at 224 (touting the benefits of redundancy “where there R
are potentially catastrophic or irreversible risks from agency failures”).
239 Mariano-Florentino Cuellar, “Securing” the Nation: Law, Politics, and Organization at
the Federal Security Agency, 1939–1953, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 587, 644 (2009).
240 Id. According to Cuellar, these include institutional sociology, political economy, and
social psychology. Id.
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primarily based on substantive jurisdictional authority.241 Relatively little at-
tention has been paid, however, to the possibility of allocating agency au-
thority along functional, as opposed to substantive, lines. Only a few
scholars have identified the possible division of authority along functional
lines242 or noted the relative scarcity of functional divisions of government
authority.243 This tendency to emphasize substance rather than function is
reflected in comparisons of centralized and decentralized, overlapping and
distinct, and coordinated and independent organizational structures.
Consideration of functional jurisdiction expands the options available
in crafting government programs to deal with social problems. Awareness of
the option of allocating jurisdiction functionally provides a more nuanced
framework for analyzing the advantages and disadvantages of alternative
structural designs. Through the prism of governmental function, legislators
can better understand, and then design, allocations of authority to promote
chosen regulatory goals.
1. Functional Jurisdiction and the Centralization-Decentralization
Dimension
Though there is an extensive literature on the advantages and disadvan-
tages of centralized and decentralized governmental authority, the literature
largely neglects the significance of functional jurisdiction. Academics fre-
quently offer arguments for or against centralized authority without consid-
ering whether the persuasiveness of those arguments differs depending on
the agency function involved.244 Similarly, when creating or reorganizing
241 See, e.g., Elizabeth Glass Geltman & Andrew E. Skroback, Reinventing the EPA to
Conform with the New American Environmentality, 23 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 6–12 (1998)
(discussing problematic development of EPA’s media-specific enforcement approach); Peter J.
Fontaine, EPA’s Multimedia Enforcement Strategy: The Struggle to Close the Environmental
Compliance Circle, 18 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 31, 50 (1993) (noting that EPA’s organizational
structure and culture have produced separate program offices with their own parochial agen-
das). See also Matthew C. Waxman, National Security Federalism in the Age of Terror, 64
STAN. L. REV. 289, 350 (2012) (suggesting reform of “specific counterterrorism intelligence
functions, to set policy-appropriate balances of centralization and localization”).
242 See, e.g., Geltman & Skroback, supra note 241, at 10 (discussing functional organiza- R
tion at EPA); Freeman & Rossi, supra note 4, at 1145 (discussing “overlapping agency func- R
tions . . . (as when two agencies share enforcement authority over the same malfeasance)” ).
243 See, e.g., David A. Weisbach & Jacob Nussim, The Integration of Tax and Spending
Programs, 113 YALE L.J. 955, 988 (2004). For further discussion analogizing the issues in-
volved in agency organization to those in organizing business entities, and citing some of the
literature on the industrial organization of firms, see Vermeule, supra note 90, at 21. R
244 See, e.g., Michael Halberstam, The Myth of “Conquered Provinces”: Probing the Ex-
tent of the VRA’s Encroachment on State and Local Autonomy, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 923, 945–46
(2011) (“Centralized decisionmakers cannot adequately replicate or anticipate the experien-
tially-based and contextual response of interested local actors who base their judgments on
their ‘particular circumstances of time and place.’”); ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, THE ECONOMY,
AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, supra note 119, at 11 (arguing for benefits of centralized R
environmental authority without regard to functional differences); Dornbos, supra note 89, at R
17 (discussing the benefits of decentralization without mentioning functional differences).
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governmental institutions, legislators regularly fail to consider functional ju-
risdiction as a factor in centralizing or decentralizing authority.245
That failure to consider on a function-by-function basis whether cen-
tralized or decentralized authority is appropriate may lead to missed oppor-
tunities for better achieving policy goals by centralizing some functions,
while decentralizing others. This is because the tradeoffs among competing
values may differ based on function. Centralizing authority to gather scien-
tific or technical information, for example, may provide significant econo-
mies of scale, while the need to experiment and take advantage of local
expertise may be minimal.246 The case for centralizing the task of accumulat-
ing the data needed for effective health care regulation, for instance, appears
strong.247 In contrast, the diversity, expertise, democratic, and experimenta-
tion benefits of decentralizing standard-setting and/or implementation func-
tions may be more important than the efficiencies resulting from having only
one regulator perform those functions, as well as any unfairness of subject-
ing affected entities to multiple standards. As Abigail Moncrieff and Eric
Lee have argued with respect to health care regulation:
If the states choose different policy approaches to manage the
costs of, quality of, and access to healthcare, then regulators might
learn which approaches work and which do not. At a minimum,
regulators would learn more through the states’ various attempts
than they ever could from a single, uniform national policy.248
Thus, it may make sense to centralize some functions but not others.
Structuring agency authority without regard to differences based on the par-
ticular governmental function may unnecessarily sacrifice important values.
The enactment of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act of 2010249 illustrates the benefits of functional distinctions in
determining whether to create centralized or decentralized authority. The
Obama Administration favored vertical decentralization, opposing preemp-
tion of stricter state regulatory protections.250 The statute reflects this stance,
245 See, e.g., NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES,
THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 399–419 (2004) (discussing the unification of national security/
intelligence operations, but not the potential for making different judgments on centralization
based on governmental function).
246 See Cary, supra note 6, at 623. R
247 See, e.g., Abigail R. Moncrieff & Eric Lee, The Positive Case for Centralization in
Health Care Regulation: The Federalism Failures of the ACA, 20 KAN. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 266,
276 (2011).
248 Id. at 276.
249 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376
(2010).
250 See DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM: A NEW FOUNDATION
61 (2009) (Obama Administration white paper proposing financial regulatory reform). For
further discussion of the background of the white paper, see Todd J. Zywicki, The Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau: Savior or Menace?, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 856, 860–61
(2013).
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limiting the authority of agencies such as the Financial Stability Oversight
Council (FSOC) and Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) to pre-
empt state regulation.251 Thus, Dodd-Frank preserves decentralization of one
function, standard setting.
Dodd-Frank’s horizontal decentralization with respect to another func-
tion, information distribution, is perhaps of more questionable value. Ac-
cording to the General Accountability Office (GAO), Dodd-Frank’s
delegation of authority to the CFPB to assist in improving the financial liter-
acy and education of individual consumers of financial products, services,
and concepts means that fourteen federal agencies are now responsible for
administering sixteen significant federal financial literacy programs or activ-
ities.252 The GAO concedes the potential benefits of having multiple federal
agencies involved in financial literacy efforts, including the ability to take
advantage of “deep and long-standing expertise and experience addressing a
specific issue area.”253 But the resulting multiplicity of authority “increases
the risk of inefficiency and duplication of efforts,”254 particularly in light of
the substantial “similarities in mission between CFPB’s statutory responsi-
bilities and those of certain other federal entities.”255 Granting the CFPB a
significant role in enhancing consumer financial protection provided an op-
portunity to consolidate federal financial literacy efforts in a more efficient
and effective way.256 The GAO urged policymakers to consider consolidating
authority over financial literacy information to avoid overlap, duplication,
and inefficiency.257 Whether the GAO’s assessment is ultimately convincing
or not, this example suggests that the pros and cons of centralization and
decentralization may differ by function, and that policymakers should care-
fully consider the possibility of different organizational structures for differ-
ent functions.
2. Functional Jurisdiction and the Overlapping-Distinct Dimension
As with analyses of the appropriate scale of government, a focus on
functional jurisdiction makes clear that decisions on whether to provide for
jurisdictional overlap are not all-or-nothing propositions. Simply because
two agencies share substantive jurisdiction does not mean that they overlap
if their functional jurisdictions are distinct. Unfortunately, proponents and
detractors of overlapping jurisdiction often ignore whether agency jurisdic-
251 Edward F. Greene & Joshua Boehm, The Limits of “Name-and-Shame” in Interna-
tional Financial Regulation, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 1083, 1094–95 (2012).
252 U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, OVERLAP OF PROGRAMS SUGGESTS
THERE MAY BE OPPORTUNITIES FOR CONSOLIDATION, GAO-12-588, at 9 (July 2012), archived
at http://perma.cc/0faWLEK3MWo.
253 Id. at 14.
254 Id.
255 Id. at 19.
256 Id. at 20.
257 Id. at 20–21.
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLL\51-1\HLL102.txt unknown Seq: 47 30-JAN-14 8:00
2014] Functional Government in 3-D 65
tions overlap functionally, losing an opportunity to accommodate some of
the accountability benefits of overlap while minimizing inefficiencies.258 Fi-
nally, policymakers may be able to better achieve regulatory goals by de-
signing governmental institutions to overlap for some functions but not
others.
Congress has sometimes chosen to define distinct realms of agency
functional authority, even though the agencies involved share substantive
jurisdictions. For example, Congress vested in one agency the authority to
adopt and in another the authority to enforce occupational safety stan-
dards.259 Similarly, the Homeland Security Act of 2002260 vested authority
over the service aspects of immigration, including asylum and naturalization,
in the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services,261 while it placed immi-
gration enforcement duties in the hands of the U.S. Customs and Border
Protection.262 Though both agencies have jurisdiction over immigration, their
authority is largely distinct because there is little overlap in functional juris-
diction. A member of a commission on immigration reform explained the
rationale for this reorganization several years before 9/11:
[P]lacing incompatible service and enforcement functions within
one agency creates problems: competition for resources; lack of
coordination and cooperation; and personnel practices that both
encourage transfer between enforcement and service positions and
create confusion regarding mission and responsibilities. Combin-
ing responsibility for enforcement and benefits also blurs the dis-
tinction between illegal migration and legal admissions.263
Yet in other cases, opportunities for promoting more efficient and effec-
tive regulation through the creation of distinct functional divisions of author-
ity may have been missed. Detractors of overlap often focus on the
inefficiencies and ineffectiveness of duplicative regulation, concluding that
the solution should be agency consolidation.264 In 1939, for example, Presi-
dent Franklin Roosevelt combined six agencies responsible for matters deal-
258 See discussion infra notes 268–269 and accompanying text. R
259 See Freeman & Rossi, supra note 4, at 1150. R
260 Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 6 U.S.C.).
261 See U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES, http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/us-
cis (last visited Oct. 6, 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/0CbdVnw72pV.
262 See U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION, http://www.cbp.gov/ (last visited Oct. 6,
2013), archived at http://perma.cc/0CbdVnw72pV; Asa Hutchinson, Holes in the Fence: Im-
migration Reform and Border Security in the United States, Keynote Address, 59 ADMIN. L.
REV. 533, 537 (2007).
263 Stephen Lee, Monitoring Immigration Enforcement, 53 ARIZ. L. REV. 1089, 1111 n.84
(2011) (quoting Alternative Proposals to Restructure the Immigration and Naturalization Ser-
vice: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Immigration and Claims of the H. Comm. on the Judi-
ciary, 105th Cong. 109-10 (1998) (statement of Susan Martin, Former Director, U.S.
Commission on Immigration Reform)).
264 See supra Part III.B.
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ing with health care, economic security, and education into a new
subcabinet-level agency, the Federal Security Agency (FSA).265 Roosevelt
justified the consolidation by highlighting the efficiency that would result
from combining agencies with shared substantive jurisdiction over matters
such as medical research, civil defense, national security, social security,
federal education assistance, weapons development, and food and drug
regulation.266
An institutional configuration characterized by shared substantive au-
thority but not functional overlap, however, might also have addressed the
same concerns. By eliminating duplication of functions, the regime would
help minimize administrative costs, the risk of over-regulation, and the im-
position of inconsistent mandates that created uncertainty and unfairness.
Retaining shared substantive authority, however, might also preserve the ac-
countability benefits from having multiple authorities involved in the regula-
tory process—albeit in charge of distinct functions. In this way, Roosevelt
could have achieved a similar level of efficiency, and perhaps even more
effective regulation, by retaining shared substantive authority while mini-
mizing overlap by allocating distinct functional duties to each agency.
Relatedly, attention to functional jurisdiction allows policymakers to
focus on whether there are good reasons to decrease overlap for one function
but maintain or increase it for another. A few scholars, such as Jody Freeman
and Jim Rossi, have helpfully recognized that the arguments in favor of cre-
ating overlapping or distinct authority may differ depending on the particular
governmental function involved.267 Yet, when most scholars or agencies
make assertions promoting overlapping jurisdiction, they appear to underap-
preciate the significance of differentiating along this dimension based on
agency function and give short shrift to whether overlap is appropriate or
effective for all governmental functions.268 Proponents of overlapping juris-
diction usually focus on the effectiveness and accountability benefits of re-
dundant institutions, especially for significant or irreplaceable resources or
for situations in which massive costs are anticipated if regulatory failure
occurs.269 Yet the assessment of whether these redundancy benefits are worth
the inefficiency costs may differ from function to function. Policymakers
might structure authority differently along the overlap-distinctness dimen-
265 See Karen M. Tani, Welfare and Rights Before the Movement: Rights as Language of
the State, 122 YALE L.J. 314, 314 (2012).
266  See id.
267 See Freeman & Rossi, supra note 4, at 1146 (arguing that overlapping authority to R
enforce the antitrust laws may create inefficiencies and disagreements over enforcement pol-
icy); id. at 1147 (noting that although two agencies set food safety standards, they bring differ-
ent kinds of expertise to the effort).
268 See, e.g., Aagaard, supra note 145, at 286–300 (addressing costs and benefits of over- R
lap, mostly without drawing clear distinctions based on function).
269 See, e.g., Katherine A. Trisolini, All Hands on Deck: Local Governments and the Po-
tential for Bidirectional Climate Change Regulation, 62 STAN. L. REV. 669, 745–46 (2010)
(describing critical role of local governments in reducing greenhouse gas emissions to “create
redundancy to compensate for regulatory failures”).
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLL\51-1\HLL102.txt unknown Seq: 49 30-JAN-14 8:00
2014] Functional Government in 3-D 67
sion because the relative value of efficiency and redundancy differs based on
the task at issue. Redundant development of information on the health risks
of pollutant exposures at different levels, for example, may create waste
without significantly improving the quality of the output.270 On the other
hand, the efficiency gains of vesting exclusive standard-setting or enforce-
ment authority in one regulator may not justify the loss of the safety net that
results from having multiple enforcement authorities to protect against defi-
cient enforcement by a single agency.271 In short, failure to consider whether
overlapping or distinct authority is preferable on a function-by-function ba-
sis may result in the unnecessary sacrifice of effectiveness to achieve effi-
ciency, or vice versa.
3. Functional Jurisdiction and the Coordination-Independence
Dimension
A few scholars have addressed the need for agency coordination across
not only substantive but also functional domains, recognizing that it may be
advisable to require coordinated action for some governmental functions but
to allow independent agency action for others.272 In discussing the federal
government’s approach to agricultural policy, for example, David Weisbach
and Jacob Nussim posit that the Internal Revenue Service is well situated to
control financing through investment subsidies, while the Department of Ag-
riculture is the best agency to regulate farmers more generally through stan-
dard-setting and related functions.273 They conclude that “separate agencies
for each function, and the resulting lack of coordination, could be
optimal.”274
More frequently, however, those analyzing agency structure promote
either increased independence or coordination without fully appreciating or
even acknowledging the significance of functional jurisdiction.275 Because
the arguments for coordinated or independent authority are likely to vary
with the governmental function in question, this oversight creates the risk
that analysts will overlook opportunities to achieve the optimal balance of
270 Cf. Sandra B. Zellmer, The Devil, the Details, and the Dawn of the 21st Century Ad-
ministrative State: Beyond the New Deal, 32 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 941, 1048 (2000) (discussing the
value of EPA’s technical expertise in adopting air quality standards).
271 See Engel, supra note 7, at 179–80 (discussing “regulatory safety net” provided by R
overlapping state and federal jurisdiction over pollution regulation and enforcement). There
may be a strong argument for distinct authority, however, if there is directly conflicting author-
ity by regulators—at any level of government—without a discernible difference in subject-
matter competence.
272 See, e.g., Arnold M. Howitt & Herman B. “Dutch” Leonard, Katrina and the Core
Challenges of Disaster Response, 30 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 215, 220 (2006).
273 Weisbach & Nussim, supra note 243, at 994–95. R
274 Id. The authors note the need to recognize “that desirable separation of functions into
divisions is going to lead to lack of coordination.” Id.
275 See, e.g., DeShazo & Freeman, supra note 7, at 2221, 2232, 2253 (discussing forms of R
agency coordination, but failing to differentiate between functional and substantive
coordination).
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policy goals by coordinating some functions, while capitalizing on the exer-
cise of independent authority for others. For instance, it may make sense to
strike the balance between avoiding the inefficiency or inconsistency (aris-
ing from uncoordinated action) and avoiding groupthink (through indepen-
dent agency authority) differently for the financing or planning and
standard-setting functions. Policymakers should not elide these differences
by confining their analysis solely to the extent of coordination in substantive
authority.
Two examples illuminate the potential value of situating disparate
agency functions at different points along the coordination-independence di-
mension. The first involves requiring multiple intelligence agencies to report
to a single supervisor, the Director of National Intelligence. The 9/11 Com-
mission and the Center for Strategic International Studies expressed con-
cerns that such coordination might suppress innovation and competition
among intelligence agencies. The commission further posited that enhanced
coordination would be likely to discourage opposing views when they were
most needed.276 Others have pointed out, however, that the value of competi-
tion may be outweighed by the risk that agencies taking inconsistent ap-
proaches in acting on accumulated intelligence will operate inefficiently, if
not at cross-purposes, thwarting achievement of efforts to thwart terrorist
attacks.277 Yet these seemingly dueling arguments are not necessarily irrec-
oncilable; the detractors of coordination were focused primarily on the gath-
ering and analysis of intelligence information, while proponents focused on
governmental action in response to the information gathered. In these cir-
cumstances, the arguments for allowing agencies to act independently may
be stronger for the information-analysis function than for the implementation
function, and effective regime design might seek to limit coordination in the
former, but promote it in the latter.
The second example involves a comparison of the National Environ-
mental Policy Act (NEPA)278 and the Endangered Species Act (ESA).279
NEPA requires each agency proposing a major federal action to consult with
and solicit the comments of other federal agencies with either jurisdiction or
special expertise during the process of preparing environmental impact state-
ments (EIS) on such proposed actions.280 The proposing agency must incor-
276 O’Connell, supra note 1, at 1685. R
277 See Freeman & Rossi, supra note 4, at 1135 (arguing that although overlap allows R
harnessing of specialized agencies’ expertise and competencies, “that potential can be wasted
if the agencies work at cross-purposes or fail to capitalize on one another’s unique strengths
and perspectives”); Aaron J. Saiger, Obama’s “Czars” for Domestic Policy and the Law of the
White House Staff, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 2577, 2588 (2011) (noting need for coordination to
control illegal drugs because law enforcement and health care agencies were ignorant of or
hostile to each other’s approaches).
278 National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (1970)
(codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–4370h (2006)).
279 Endangered Species Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-205, 87 Stat. 884 (1973) (codified as
amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–1544 (2006)).
280 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (2006).
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porate or respond to any comments in the final EIS.281 In addition, NEPA
created an agency, the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ), to super-
vise compliance by other agencies with their NEPA evaluation and disclo-
sure responsibilities, a task it has undertaken through the issuance of binding
regulations that govern NEPA implementation by other agencies.282 NEPA
thus provides for coordination across the federal government of information-
gathering and planning responsibilities283 concerning agency actions that
may affect the environment. NEPA does little, however, to require agencies
to undertake or coordinate monitoring of the actual environmental impacts
of activities for which impact statements have been prepared once imple-
mentation of those activities begins.284 NEPA would likely have been more
effective at actually minimizing the adverse environmental consequences of
federal agency activities if it had extended coordination obligations to moni-
toring the effects of project activities so that agencies would have the benefit
of information and input from the CEQ in deciding whether to alter ongoing
projects to reduce unanticipated adverse environmental effects.285
Some NEPA critics go one step further by criticizing the statute’s failure
to require substantive changes to a proposed action in response to impacts
anticipated in an EIS. The Supreme Court has clearly ruled that NEPA’s
mandates are procedural in nature, not substantive.286 Critics have urged that
NEPA be amended (or reinterpreted by the courts) to infuse substantive con-
tent into its environmental protection mandates, such as by requiring agen-
cies to adopt or comply with environmental mitigation measures proposed
by the CEQ, or at least to justify departures from the CEQ’s recommenda-
tions.287 Short of such a fundamental change in the statute, one way to in-
crease the CEQ’s coordinating role would be to vest in it the authority to
remand projects on the basis of their adverse environmental effects. The re-
sulting system would provide a stronger form of agency coordination, and
perhaps a more effective process for avoiding federal actions that harm the
environment, than NEPA now provides.
281 40 C.F.R. § 1503.4(a).
282 Id. at § 1500.3.
283 See id. at §§ 1501.1, 1501.2(a).
284 The CEQ regulations provide only that “[a]gencies may provide for monitoring to
assure that their decisions are carried out and should do so in important cases.” 40 C.F.R.
§ 1505.3.
285 The CEQ regulations do require the preparation of a supplemental EIS if substantial
changes occur that are relevant to environmental concerns or there are significant new circum-
stances or information relevant to those concerns. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.9(c). However, there is no
requirement to coordinate any monitoring of project effects that might give rise to a supple-
mental EIS. Id.
286 Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S.
519, 558 (1978).
287 James T.B. Tripp & Nathan G. Alley, Streamlining NEPA’s Environmental Review Pro-
cess: Suggestions for Agency Reform, 12 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 74, 76–77 (2003) (citing criti-
ques to this effect).
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Although such a strengthening of NEPA’s coordination mechanisms is
unlikely to occur any time soon, the ESA provides a model for what that
form of coordination might look like. The ESA mandates federal interagency
coordination not only in information generation and planning,288 but also in
project implementation. Section 7 requires federal agencies to avoid actions
that will “jeopardize the continued existence” of listed endangered or
threatened species or “result in the destruction or adverse modification of”
their critical habitat.289 It requires an agency to consult with the National
Marine Fisheries Service (for marine species) or Fish and Wildlife Service
(for freshwater and wildlife species) on any agency action which is likely to
jeopardize a listed species.290 The formal consultation process concludes
when the Service issues a biological opinion on whether the proposed activ-
ity is likely to jeopardize a listed species or adversely modify critical habitat,
suggesting reasonable and prudent alternatives (RPAs) that would avoid such
harms. The opinion may also include an incidental take statement condition-
ally authorizing the take of individual species members, provided the agency
complies with the specified RPAs.291 According to the Supreme Court, the
Service’s Biological Opinion has a powerful coercive effect.292 If the action
agency ignores the RPAs, it must articulate its reasons for disagreement. If
those reasons turn out to be wrong, the agency runs a substantial risk293 of
violating the statutory prohibition on the taking of listed species,294 while an
agency that complies with the terms of an incidental take statement is
shielded from a finding that it has violated that prohibition.295
Though both NEPA and the ESA require inter-agency coordination, the
ESA’s coordination mandates extend beyond information gathering and
planning to project implementation, illustrating that it is possible to require
coordination for some functions but not others. Policymakers should con-
sider the benefits and disadvantages of coordination and independence on a
function-by-function basis. They may conclude that coordination of one
function will provide efficiency and policy effectiveness gains that justify
the administrative costs of coordination and the risk of groupthink that stifles
innovation. For a different function, however, the balance may point in an-
other direction.
288 See 16 U.S.C. § 1535 (governing cooperation between the Interior Department and the
states, including consultation and federal financial assistance).
289 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (2006).
290 See 50 C.F.R. § 402.06 (2013).
291 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(3)–(4); 50 C.F.R. § 402.14 (2013).
292 Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 169 (1997).
293 See id.
294 Id. at 170. The taking prohibition is codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1)(B) (2006).
295 16 U.S.C. § 1536(o)(2) (2006).
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B. The Importance of Appreciating the Dimensions of Authority
The literature on how to apportion substantive authority is much more
extensive than the literature on functional authority.296 Nevertheless, this
literature is incomplete for two reasons. First, scholars and policymakers
often fail to consider how authority should be allocated along each of the
dimensions described in Part III. Second, even when they do consider multi-
ple dimensions of authority, they sometimes conflate the advantages and dis-
advantages of locating authority along two or more of the dimensions.
Regardless of the particular dimensions that are being neglected or con-
flated, the bottom line is the same—incomplete vetting of the organizational
choices and lost opportunities to foster primary goals or achieve comple-
mentary objectives. Separating out the dimensions as we suggest will pre-
serve as many policy options as possible among competing organizational
structures. Determinations of where to situate a particular program along
each dimension should reflect consideration of the values promoted by each
dimensional choice and prioritization of any conflicting values.
The three dimensions should not be viewed in isolation; in all but one
situation, they are iterative. If policymakers with authority to contemplate
the creation of a new government program or the reorganization of an ex-
isting one choose to vest all authority to administer the program in a single
centralized governmental entity, they need not consider either of the other
two dimensions.297 As Figure 6 below demonstrates, if the desired program is
decentralized (either among governmental levels or within a level), then
more than one agency will necessarily have authority (unless the geographic
boundaries of each regulator’s jurisdiction are mutually exclusive).298 If more
than one governmental entity has jurisdiction, policymakers have meaning-
296 The literature on the federalism aspects of government programs is particularly exten-
sive. See Alessandra Arcuri & Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci, Centralization and Decentralization
as a Risk-Return Trade-off, 53 J. L. & ECON. 359, 361 (2010) (discussing the literature in this
field).
297 Even in this circumstance, the single institution may exercise substantive authority that
is at least peripherally within the realm of other entities’ substantive powers, both within and
outside the jurisdiction. There may be value in considering coordination with these other enti-
ties. In addition, agencies are not monolithic entities, and different divisions or offices within a
single agency may provide choices along the overlap and coordination dimensions.
298 Both New York City and Los Angeles have the authority to adopt land use controls
such as zoning laws. See, e.g., National Helicopter Corp. of Am. v. City of New York, 137
F.3d 81, 89 (2d Cir. 1998) (“As a proprietor, [New York City]. . . . has the power to promul-
gate reasonable, nonarbitrary and non-discriminatory [land use] regulations.”); CAL. CONST,
art. 11, § 7 (providing that a “county or city may make and enforce within its limits all local,
police, sanitary and other ordinances and regulations not in conflict with general laws”). In
most respects, this Article is not concerned with the relationship between the authority of those
two regulators. They do not have overlapping jurisdiction, as this Article uses that term, even
though both are authorized to regulate land use, because no landowner is subject to the juris-
diction of both agencies. The structuring of agency authority to allow geographically distinct
regulators to act is relevant to the centralization-decentralization dimension, however, to the
extent that decentralization is justified by the desire to promote experimentation and innova-
tion by multiple regulators.
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ful institutional design options beyond simply choosing a decentralized
structure. The remaining options involve whether to vest the two or more
agencies that will have jurisdiction with distinct or overlapping authority,
and whether to allow or require those agencies to act independently of one
another or to allow or require coordinated action.
Figure 6. Dimension Relationships
The interactions among the dimensions are important because they may
act synergistically or at cross-purposes with one another. Although the divid-
ing lines among the dimensions will in some instances blur at the margins,299
we suggest that the values promoted by the poles of each dimension are
sufficiently different from one another that there is value in considering each
choice sequentially.
Thus, for example, suppose that policymakers have chosen to create a
program of both federal and state authority in order to achieve the diversity,
experimentation, and accountability benefits of a decentralized regime. They
should next consider whether they prefer overlapping authority among fed-
eral and state regulators (to provide redundancy and a safety net against
inactivity or capture by regulators at one level), or instead prefer to promote
the efficiencies resulting from the creation of distinct regulatory responsibili-
ties.300 Finally, policymakers should consider whether they place a higher
299 For example, efforts to reduce overlap may bleed over into centralization.
300 See Hyman & Kovacic, supra note 58, at 28–29 (urging that issues concerning overlap R
be considered in terms of the optimal level of agency and regulatory redundancy/overlap—a
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priority on achieving the efficiencies of coordinated regulation among multi-
ple regulators and on minimizing the risk of agencies working at cross-pur-
poses, or instead on the effectiveness advantages that stem from allowing
regulators to act independently so as to avoid groupthink that may stifle the
experimentation benefits provided by decentralized government.
The discussion below elaborates on the importance of the dimensions of
authority, both individually and in relation to one another. It illustrates how
regulatory programs may be adversely affected by neglect or conflation of
the consequences of moving along each of the dimensions.
1. Conflation of the Overlap/Distinct and Decentralized/Centralized
Dimensions
As Jody Freeman and Jim Rossi have pointed out, “[i]nstances of over-
lap and fragmentation are not rare or isolated. They can be found throughout
the administrative state, in virtually every sphere of social and economic
regulation, in contexts ranging from border security to food safety to finan-
cial regulation.”301 A growing literature promotes overlapping jurisdiction
based on its capacity to provide diversity, experimentation, and expertise
benefits, but some scholars appear to commingle the advantages of overlap
with those of decentralized authority.302 For example, some have promoted
overlapping jurisdiction based on its capacity to take advantage of the exer-
cise of authority that is tailored to particular regulatory circumstances or to
benefit from unique agency expertise.303 Such arguments conflate overlap
with decentralization because the benefits of accommodating diversity of
circumstances or taking advantage of agency expertise are more appropri-
ately attributed to decentralized governance.304 Put another way, decentrali-
zation is the feature that allows for localized tailoring of regulation and the
application of an array of expertise, not the fact that the authority is
overlapping.
Likewise, some proponents of overlapping jurisdiction argue that a key
benefit is that it allows significant experimentation opportunities. One
scholar, for example, in discussing the benefits of redundancy, posits that
“[d]iffering perspectives allow agencies to function more like laboratories,
framing which necessarily requires balancing the costs and benefits of such strategies com-
pared to the alternatives).
301 Freeman & Rossi, supra note 4, at 1134. R
302 See, e.g., O’Connell, supra note 1, at 1659 (equating redundancy and decentralization); R
see also id. at 1673 n.104 (same, but recognizing that differences may exist).
303 See, e.g., Doran, supra note 176, at 1820 (stating that information theory “implies that R
the institutional determinants of redundancy usually facilitate specialization”); see also id. at
1849 (discussing theory that Congress enacts redundant programs to pursue informational
efficiency).
304 For a description of the expertise and diversity benefits of decentralization, see supra
text accompanying notes 107–108. R
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by devising new solutions to new problems.”305 Another proponent claims
that redundancy “enables a range of experts with diverse viewpoints to con-
tribute to the lawmaking process and it fosters competition and rivalry
among decisionmakers, leading to a level of innovation and creativity that is
impossible to achieve with a single decisionmaking body.”306 Still others
have asserted that overlapping authorities “are more likely to discover which
instruments most effectively respond” to a particular problem.307
These arguments also largely conflate decentralized with overlapping
authority.308 The opportunity to learn from the experiences of other jurisdic-
tions that have adopted different regulatory strategies is more appropriately
regarded as a benefit of decentralized governance.309 If policymakers adopt a
redundant governmental structure in order to achieve the diversity or experi-
mentation benefits of having multiple regulators, they may fail to appreciate
that though decentralization promotes those ends, a decentralized regime can
be structured with either overlapping or distinct authority. The choices along
that dimension call for analysis of the tradeoff between the efficiency advan-
tages of a system of distinct authority and the protections against capture and
agency inaction310 provided by overlapping authority.
Conflation of these two dimensions sometimes also occurs in the oppo-
site direction. Scholars have attributed the benefits of creating a regulatory
safety net that protects against the risk of capture and agency inaction to
decentralization of authority.311 Decentralized authority may not create such
a safety net, however, if each agency is assigned a discrete substantive juris-
diction. It is the overlap and coordination of jurisdiction among multiple
agencies that may protect against capture and inaction, not
decentralization.312
305 Neal Kumar Katyal, Internal Separation of Powers: Checking Today’s Most Dangerous
Branch from Within, 115 YALE L.J. 2314, 2325 (2006).
306 Nancy Staudt, Redundant Tax and Spending Programs, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 1197,
1200 (2006).
307 Ruhl & Salzman, supra note 7, at 107. R
308 In rare circumstances when experimentation must occur quickly, such as when the
problem to be addressed by government is expected to be ephemeral and/or infrequent, overlap
may be a way to spur innovation. In such cases, simultaneous activity by agencies with over-
lapping jurisdiction may be best suited to generating the lessons provided by experimentation.
309 See Wulf A. Kaal, Initial Reflections on the Possible Application of Contingent Capital
in Corporate Governance, 26 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 281, 317 (2012)
(“[E]xperimentation is probably most effective when several different approaches can be tried
simultaneously in different jurisdictions.”); Esty, Environmental Federalism, supra note 6, at R
606 (“A decentralized regulatory strategy permits the simultaneous testing of various policy
responses.”).
310 See Katyal, supra note 305, at 2324 (discussing the risks of relying on one agency R
because “[w]hen one bulb blows, everything goes”).
311 See, e.g., Aagaard, supra note 145, at 294–95. R
312 See supra notes 175–178 and accompanying text. The degree to which overlap coun- R
ters capture depends on whether one of the agencies with overlapping jurisdiction has the
authority to veto actions by others. It also depends on whether each agency has the authority to
proceed without the consent of the others. If, for example, a regulated entity wants to squelch
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Although overlap provides redundancy benefits, it also creates the po-
tential for duplicative regulation that wastes agency resources, regulation
that creates conflicting or onerous obligations for regulated entities, or inad-
equate regulation by agencies seeking to rely on (or blame) the efforts of
peer agencies.313 A common response to the incentives toward either over-
regulation or under-regulation caused by overlapping governance is to call
for the consolidation of regulatory authority.314 Proponents of centralized au-
thority argue that consolidation within a governmental level minimizes the
pursuit of divergent goals or inconsistent actions by multiple agencies that
may interfere with agency missions.315 However, consolidation is not the
only way to address inappropriate levels or methods of regulation. Instead,
policymakers can retain the same number of agencies and delegate distinct
tasks to each. Conflation of the overlap-distinctness and decentralization-
centralization dimensions masks this option.
The reorganization of federal agencies to establish the Department of
Homeland Security (“DHS”) is illustrative. Congress created the DHS in
2002 out of more fragmented federal authorities in part to reduce the likeli-
hood that the numerous existing intelligence-gathering agencies would work
at cross-purposes.316 Some have questioned whether the pre-2002 landscape
actually was characterized by excessive overlap of agency authority.317 Even
if it was, however, it is not clear that consolidation effectively reduced inter-
agency interference. Professors Freeman and Rossi charge that the 2002 Act
failed to eliminate overlapping and potentially conflicting functions within
the new DHS.318
In such cases, rather than centralizing authority by reducing the number
of agencies, policymakers should consider either delineating more distinct
lines of substantive authority or allocating distinct functional authority to
different agencies with jurisdiction over the same subject matter.319
regulatory action, it will be easier for it to achieve its goal by capturing an agency with veto
power than multiple agencies, each of which has the authority to regulate on its own.
313 See supra notes 147–159 and accompanying text. See also Aagaard, supra note 145, at R
287–88; Marisam, supra note 21, at 198. R
314 See supra note 163 and accompanying text. R
315 See, e.g., Kirti Datla & Richard L. Revesz, Deconstructing Independent Agencies (and
Executive Agencies), 98 CORNELL L. REV. 769, 803 (2013) (arguing that “centralized control
ensures consistency. When the government speaks with one voice, particularly on issues that
recur across the government, citizens can better predict what the government’s position will
be.”).
316 See Cohen et al., supra note 1, at 683–84. R
317 See, e.g., Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Outsourcing Is Not Our Only Problem, 76 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 1216, 1224 (2008).
318 Freeman & Rossi, supra note 4, at 1153–54. R
319 According to several observers, folding FEMA into the DHS deemphasized emergency
management, thereby hampering the response to Hurricane Katrina. Elizabeth F. Kent,
“Where’s the Cavalry?” Federal Response to 21st Century Disasters, 40 SUFFOLK U. L. REV.
181, 206 (2006); Cohen et al., supra note 1, at 740. Increased centralization may have subordi- R
nated emergency management to the DHS’s priority concern—prevention of terrorism. Reduc-
tion of overlap by assigning emergency response implementation to one agency and
information gathering and planning functions to another may have minimized inter-agency
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2. Conflation of the Coordination/Independence and Decentralized/
Centralized Dimensions
It is tempting to consider substantial levels of coordination to be akin to
centralized authority. However, even at its most robust, coordination is a
different characteristic of governance than centralization.320 The benefits of
centralization include achieving economies of scale, addressing collective
action problems such as inter-jurisdictional spillovers, and achieving fairness
by both creating uniformity and weakening the power of factions.321 Coordi-
nation promotes cost-effective government and reduces the risk that the acts
of one authority will counteract or frustrate those of another.322 Though cen-
tralization may help decrease the costs of coordination, the two seek funda-
mentally different goals.
Yet, many policymakers and scholars have touted coordinated govern-
ment as a way to take advantage of economies of scale.323 As Professor Jacob
Gersen has noted, the centralized regulatory review literature “often equates
coordination with centralized control, even though centralization is neither a
necessary nor a sufficient condition for coordination. Strong vertical control
over subordinates may facilitate coordination, but there seems to be no
shortage of lackadaisical supervisors in the world.”324 Likewise, extensive
inter-jurisdictional coordination can certainly occur in a largely decentral-
ized regime.325
Though some may fail to differentiate coordination from centralization,
others actually have conflated coordinated and decentralized authority. Some
scholars have advocated coordination as a way to garner the benefits of mul-
tiple perspectives, specialized knowledge, and opportunities for agencies to
test new ideas.326 To be sure, some coordination of information between au-
thorities must occur for these benefits to accrue. However, because these
diversity and expertise benefits more fundamentally rely on the existence of
various authorities, we assert that these are primarily attributes of
decentralization.
Still other scholars conflate decentralization with independence. These
commentators have asserted that a key attribute of decentralized governance
interference while continuing to allow agencies to benefit from their respective experience and
expertise.
320 See Hyman & Kovacic, supra note 58, at 27 (arguing that “the coordination of func- R
tions and responsibilities will not happen merely because previously separate bureaus are com-
bined into a single department”).
321 See supra Part III.A.2.
322 See supra notes 196–203 and accompanying text. R
323 Symposium, Sustainable Energy Development in Emerging Markets, 24 U. PA. J. INT’L
L. 759, 792 (2003) (remarks of Steven Richards) (concerning energy access).
324 Jacob E. Gersen, Unbundled Powers, 96 VA. L. REV. 301, 346 (2010).
325 See generally COUNCIL OF GREAT LAKES GOVERNORS, THE GREAT LAKES CHARTER:
PRINCIPLES FOR THE MANAGEMENT OF GREAT LAKES WATER RESOURCES (1985); see also
supra note 219 (discussing coordination through interstate compacts). R
326 See Freeman & Rossi, supra note 4, at 1210. R
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is that it provides a way for governmental authorities to compete with each
other and thus promote efficiency and effectiveness. According to one
source, for example, “economic insights, such as the heterogeneity of prefer-
ences and the efficiency of the competitive process for government regula-
tion, may lead to the conclusion that decentralization guarantees efficiency
gains.”327 However, while some level of decentralization of governmental
authority undoubtedly must exist for there to be inter-jurisdictional competi-
tion, it is not decentralization, but rather the independence of multiple agen-
cies with jurisdiction over a problem, that provides the primary foundation
for competition. For example, lodging considerable governmental jurisdic-
tion in only two or three national agencies might create a fairly centralized
regulatory regime, yet such governmental authorities could be designed to be
highly competitive.328 Likewise, a fundamentally decentralized allocation of
governmental authority might nonetheless involve considerable cooperation
and collaboration between governmental authorities, hardly the hallmark of
inter-jurisdictional competition.329
By conflating the coordination/independence and centralization/decen-
tralization dimensions, scholars and policymakers lose an opportunity to bet-
ter tailor the design of governmental authority. If a policymaker’s goal is to
achieve economies of scale or uniform and equitable regulatory treatment,
then centralization is often the best way to do so. If, however, a policymaker
decides to create a decentralized regime to take advantage of the democracy,
diversity, expertise, and experimentation benefits that such a structure is apt
to provide, the policymaker should further consider whether decentralized
power should be accompanied by coordination or independence among the
multiple agencies authorized to address the problem in question. That choice
involves a tradeoff between either the advantages of a fair and cost-efficient
structure that minimizes the risk of conflicting policy approaches,330 or the
advantages of a structure that avoids the administrative costs of coordinated
action and fosters competition while protecting against groupthink. Confla-
tion of the centralization/decentralization and coordination/independence
327 Aure´lian Portuese, The Principle of Subsidiarity as a Principle of Economic Efficiency,
17 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 231, 239 (2011); but see Clayton P. Gillette, Fiscal Federalism, Political
Will, and Strategic Use of Municipal Bankruptcy, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 281, 310 (2012) (ques-
tioning assumption that decentralized decision making and inter-jurisdictional competition will
foster fiscal responsibility and efficiency).
328 Cf. O’Connell, supra note 1 (advocating an almost exclusively federal but competitive R
governmental regime for national security intelligence gathering).
329 See, e.g., Blake Hudson, Fail-Safe Federalism and Climate Change: The Case of U.S.
and Canadian Forest Policy, 44 CONN. L. REV. 925, 936 (2012) (arguing for decentralized but
coordinated forest policy-making process); Garrick B. Pursley & Hannah J. Wiseman, Local
Energy, 60 EMORY L.J. 877, 935 (2011) (supporting decentralized but cooperative regime for
renewable energy development).
330 See Freeman & Rossi, supra note 4, at 1182 (discussing potential for conflicting inter- R
pretations of legal requirements and incompatible compliance requirements absent
coordination).
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dimensions may mask the important tradeoffs involved in situating a regime
along the latter dimension.
One example of a reorganization effort that may have failed to appreci-
ate the option of moving along the coordination-independence dimension
instead of the centralization-decentralization dimension is the reorganization
of agency power over consumer financial products and services that resulted
from enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010.331 Dodd-Frank delegated to
the newly created CFPB the combined authority of seven federal agencies
previously responsible for protecting consumers of financial services.332 Part
of the impetus for that consolidation was dissatisfaction with the competition
between the OTS and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC)
for new charters by banks and thrift institutions.333 By lowering their stan-
dards, the OTS and the OCC competed for the ability to issue charters to
banks and thrift institutions, which had the option of choosing to subject
themselves to either regulator.334 As two scholars explained, “[t]he combi-
nation of fee dependence on the part of the regulators and the ability of
regulated institutions to credibly threaten to switch charters is thought by
detractors to create a capture-ready environment, in which agencies become
beholden to the industries that underwrite their budgets.”335 The existence of
multiple agencies charged with regulating consumer financial transactions
created a diffusion of responsibility and lax enforcement.336 Dodd-Frank
consolidated in the CFPB federal regulatory functions—including research,
information distribution, and standard setting—over banks and thrifts as a
way to eliminate inter-agency competition that reduced the effectiveness of
regulation.337
Greater centralization of regulatory power was not the only way to re-
duce destructive competition, however. Indeed, the antidote for excessive
competition is perhaps more logically found by moving toward the coordina-
tion end of the independence-coordination dimension. According to some
assessments, congressional efforts to consolidate authority in order to
streamline and eliminate destructive inter-agency competition did not fully
succeed, since “Congress did not substantially reduce or consolidate existing
federal regulators, as some had proposed, [meaning that] information shar-
331 See supra notes 62–63, 249–257 and accompanying text (discussing the Dodd-Frank R
Act).
332 Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Financial Services Industry’s Misguided Quest to Under-
mine the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, 31 REV. OF BANKING & FINANCIAL L. 881,
882 (2012).
333 See Lawrence G. Baxter, Capture Nuances in Financial Regulation, 47 WAKE FOREST
L. REV. 537, 543–44 (2012).
334 Dain C. Donelson & David Zaring, Requiem for a Regulator: The Office of Thrift
Supervision’s Performance During the Financial Crisis, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1777, 1781 (2011).
335 Id. at 1785.
336 That configuration also may have contributed to unequal and unfair treatment of par-
ticipants in those transactions at the hands of different regulators.
337 ADAM J. LEVITIN, THE PEW ECONOMIC GROUP: THE CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTEC-
TION AGENCY 7 (2009).
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ing and coordination remain significant challenges to the effective operation
of the fragmented regime.”338 As these scholars recognized, Congress may
have been better advised to require information sharing and other forms of
coordination of the activities of multiple bank and thrift regulators instead of
consolidating authority in the hands of the CFPB.339 For one thing, a single,
centralized agency may be more prone to tunnel vision that prevents consid-
eration of multiple avenues of addressing problems and more vulnerable to
capture than a series of agencies whose actions are coordinated.340 At the
very least, a move toward greater coordination (without centralization)
should have been on the table as an option worth considering. Allowing
multiple agencies to retain authority but requiring them to coordinate might
have reduced destructive (and unfair) inter-agency competition, while taking
advantage of the expertise and experimentation benefits that decentralized
governance may supply.
A similar story may be told about the adoption of the Homeland Secur-
ity Act in response to the events of 9/11, which is also discussed above in
connection with conflation of the overlap/distinctness and centralization/de-
centralization dimensions.341 Congress consolidated the authority of many
federal agencies in the new DHS in part to reduce competition among agen-
cies performing intelligence functions that was perceived as counterproduc-
tive.342 Some critics have taken issue with the objective of eliminating
competition, which they believe had yielded helpful policy innovations.343
Even if reduced competition was desirable, however, others have concluded
that the creation of the DHS failed to increase the efficiency of intelligence-
gathering functions,344 and that coordination across agencies was better than
within the sprawling new Department.345 They claim that it may have been
possible to accomplish the efficiency and effectiveness gains sought with the
creation of the DHS through the creation of a much smaller White House-
338 Freeman & Rossi, supra note 4, at 1148. R
339 Id. at 1154.
340 Cf. Zywicki, supra note 250 at 875–76 (referring to flaws in the CFPB’s bureaucratic R
organization, including “a tunnel vision selection bias and commitment to regulatory mission,
systematic risk-averse bias in agency decisionmaking, a tendency toward agency overreach
and expansionism, and a heightened risk of regulatory capture by industry participants”).
341 See supra notes 316–318 and accompanying text. R
342 Cohen et al., supra note 1, at 718. R
343 Id. at 752.
344 Id. at 751–52.
345 Cf. Cohen et al., supra note 1, at 742 (arguing that the structural problems associated R
with the creation of the DHS “made things worse” with respect to the effectiveness of disaster
response, and that “[e]ven if one makes unrealistic assumptions about the potential coordina-
tion payoffs [of a single agency] over time, the shortcomings in FEMA’s and DHS’s responses
to Katrina are consistent with the existence of steep transition costs”). Had Congress paid
more attention to functional rather than substantive jurisdiction, it might have chosen to coor-
dinate among agencies with authority to protect national security for certain functions but not
others. It might have decided, for example, not to coordinate information gathering to preserve
the independence of agencies and promote innovative competition among them. It may also
have decided, however, to require coordinated implementation of national security plans and
programs to prevent agencies from working at cross-purposes.
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based agency that facilitated coordination at a fraction of the administrative
costs that the shifting of responsibilities from other agencies to the DHS
entailed.346 A decision to increase coordination without centralizing authority
previously exercised by many agencies within a single new Department also
may have preserved the expertise built up by the agencies folded into the
DHS.347
3. Conflation of the Coordination/Independence and Overlap/
Distinct Dimensions
Another source of potential confusion among policymakers and schol-
ars is the conflation of coordination and overlap. For example, an article
discussing wildfire management policy along the wildland-urban interface
describes the governing regime as having shifted from one dominated by the
U.S. Forest Service to one in which state and local governments now play a
significant role.348 In describing the benefits of this “overlapping authority
regime,” the article refers to the strengthening of state and local firefighting
resources through increased funding, investment in the dissemination of best
practices and standards, resource sharing, and more generally, the strength-
ening of interagency ties.349 However, the sharing of resources and informa-
tion, as well as the strengthening of interagency ties, are more accurately
attributed to a coordinated regime, not necessarily an overlapping one. Mul-
tiple agencies with overlapping authority could work completely in igno-
rance of what agencies with shared authority are doing, or even at cross-
purposes. Likewise, governmental authorities with little overlap in jurisdic-
tion, such as peer agencies from different states, often coordinate and learn
from common experiences in their exercise of authority.350
Similarly, some have conflated the opposite ends of these two dimen-
sions—that is, distinct and independent authority. Professor O’Connell, for
example, has asserted that distinct authorities can avoid the groupthink to
which redundant authority is prone.351 Groupthink is more appropriately re-
garded, however, as the byproduct of highly coordinated authority. It is not
the existence of multiple agencies, each with its own discrete set of responsi-
bilities, which is likely to suppress alternative points of view in an effort to
achieve harmony and conformity. Rather, it is the process of coordination
346 Cohen et al., supra note 1, at 712, 753. R
347 According to one observer, congressional neglect of expertise developed by agencies
before the creation of DHS “threatens those aspects of the other agencies’ missions that over-
lap with new homeland security agenda.” Jon Kalmuss-Katz, Eco Anti-terrorism: EPA’s Role
in Securing Our Nation’s Chemical Plants, 18 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 689, 733 (2011).
348 Lauren Wishnie, Fire and Federalism, 17 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 1006 (2008).
349 Id. at 1015–16.
350 See, e.g., Freeman & Rossi, supra note 4, at 1156 n.105 (discussing “Brown Bag R
Lunch Group” involving information exchange among officials from across the government,
to “develop common approaches to shared problems”).
351 O’Connell, supra note 1, at 1676. R
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among agencies that may lead to downplaying or suppression of novel ideas
and approaches.352 These tendencies to “go along to get along” can be
avoided by allowing and encouraging agencies to act independently—
whether or not their respective jurisdictions overlap or are distinct.
Other scholars have identified a tradeoff between specialization and co-
ordination.353 We regard these as two separate choices—overlap or distinct-
ness (a form of specialization), and coordination or independence. The first
pair deals largely with a tradeoff between effectiveness through the creation
of redundant authorities and efficiency through the elimination of duplica-
tion of functions. The latter, however, largely entails choosing between in-
creasing effectiveness (by reducing opportunities for agencies to work at
cross-purposes) and reducing administrative costs (by avoiding the need to
coordinate) as well as enhancing effectiveness (by averting groupthink).
These two dimensions—overlap/distinctness and coordination/indepen-
dence—both involve efficiency-effectiveness considerations, but they differ
from one another.
The foremost problems with conflating the overlap/distinctness and co-
ordination/independence dimensions are, again, the risks of missed opportu-
nities and thwarted goals. A policymaker may choose to require coordination
among multiple regulators as a means of achieving cost-effectiveness and
reducing opportunities for conflicting approaches.354 Unless policymakers
also consider whether the coordinating agencies should have overlapping or
distinct authority, however, they may never address whether it is better to
supplement those goals with a structure that creates redundancy as a means
of creating a safety net against inaction, or instead with a structure that is
designed to achieve the administrative efficiencies resulting from the crea-
tion of a distinct set of substantive authorities.355 Likewise, policymakers
initially may choose overlapping authority to create a safeguard against reg-
ulatory failure. They should also consider, however, whether they prefer a
coordinated approach that minimizes opportunities for working at cross-pur-
poses or an approach that stresses the need to combat groupthink.
A recent example of coordination of overlapping authority is the Intelli-
gence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004,356 which requires the
President to facilitate the sharing of information relating to terrorism among
federal, state, and local entities. In 2008, the Director of National Intelli-
gence published a strategy declaring “the imperative need [to move] be-
yond considering State and local government only [as] ‘first responders,’
352 See John Wood, Note. The “Constitution of Man”: Reflections on Human Nature from
the Federalist Papers to Behavioral Law and Economics, 7 N.Y.U. J. L. & LIBERTY 184, 188
(2013) (“Publius understood how coordinated action is beleaguered by organizational con-
straints such as collective action problems, rent-seeking, free-riders, groupthink, and
holdouts.”).
353 See, e.g., Weisbach & Nussim, supra note 243, at 992. R
354 See supra note 197 and accompanying text. R
355 See supra notes 147–49, 175–78 and accompanying text. R
356 6 U.S.C. § 485 (2006).
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preferring instead [to think] of them as the first line of defense in a very
deep line of information assets.”357 The federal government, through the
DHS, has since financed state-operated “fusion centers” to promote commu-
nication and coordination in the information gathering function among re-
gional, state, and local authorities on intelligence matters.358
The USA PATRIOT Act of 2011359 also sheds light on the relationship
between the overlap/distinctness and coordination/independence dimensions.
Policymakers developed a consensus that national security officials needed
to share information to help them “connect the dots” that would allow the
government to prevent future attacks.360 Notably, however, coordination did
not necessarily mean the elimination of redundancy, which represents a dif-
ferent dimension in our typology. Professor Nathan Sales explained that
coupling coordination with redundancy facilitates information sharing, re-
sulting in competitive analysis among intelligence agencies consulting a
common pool of information, exposing policy makers to diverse perspec-
tives, and counteracting “groupthink tendencies.”361
Though we concur that reliance on redundant authority is not inconsis-
tent with coordination, we would characterize the structure created by the
USA PATRIOT Act somewhat differently. We regard competition as a by-
product of independent action by co-regulators, not redundancy (or overlap).
The Act actually seems to have required coordination among national secur-
ity with respect to one function—information distribution or sharing—to
promote efficiency and avoid waste.362 At the same time, it encouraged com-
petition through independent performance of a different function—informa-
tion analysis—so as to garner the benefits of competition and to avoid
groupthink.363
In short, by conflating the overlap/distinctness and coordination/inde-
pendence dimensions, policymakers risk creating institutions unable to act in
ways most likely to achieve regulatory goals. By requiring coordination of
overlapping authority, for example, policymakers may forfeit the opportu-
nity to reap the benefits of competition that might have resulted from en-
couraging overlapping regulators to exercise independent authority in
carrying out a function such as information analysis.
357 Waxman, supra note 241, at 304–05. R
358 Id. at 308–09.
359 Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (codified as amended in scattered titles of U.S.C.).
360 Nathan Alexander Sales, Mending Walls: Information Sharing after the USA Patriot
Act, 88 TEX. L. REV. 1795, 1796 (2010).
361 Id. at 1801–02.
362 See Sales, supra note 360, at 1799 (noting that coordination and sharing in intelligence R
gathering are likely to produce “efficiency gains by allowing different intelligence agencies to
specialize in collecting particular kinds of information”).
363 See O’Connell, supra note 1, at 1690 (urging such functional allocation). R
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V. PRELIMINARY GENERALIZATIONS ON FUNCTIONAL ALLOCATIONS
ALONG DIMENSIONAL LINES
Decisions on how to allocate governmental authority are critical to the
fate of regulatory programs. Unfortunately, scholars and policymakers rou-
tinely ignore how the nature of the governmental functions discussed in Part
II may affect assessments of the comparative merits of allocating authority
along the dimensions of governmental authority we distinguish in Part III.
They also regularly conflate these dimensions. As Part IV demonstrates, fail-
ure to consider functional jurisdiction or discriminate among the different
dimensions of authority risks frustrating efforts to promote public goals or
unnecessarily sacrificing complementary values.
The appropriate balance among competing goals or values inevitably
depends on context.364 Nevertheless, it is useful to postulate how the relative
merits of dimensional allocations of authority are likely to differ by function.
Analysis of the interface between functional jurisdiction and allocations of
authority along each of the three dimensions may suggest novel opportuni-
ties to maximize the advantages of a particular allocation choice while mini-
mizing its risks. In this Part, we begin by providing a few preliminary
observations regarding likely general tendencies in the allocation of
authority.
A. Coordinating or Centralizing Research, Information Dissemination,
and Financing
In general, arguments for centralization and coordination are likely to
be stronger for scientific research, information management, and financing
than for other governmental functions. Centralization is frequently a way for
agencies to overcome collective action problems, assuming information ac-
cumulated by one agency will be shared with others.365 In addition, centrali-
zation366 or coordination367 can produce administrative efficiencies by
reducing duplication of effort. On the other hand, the experimentation and
diversity benefits of decentralizing scientific research, as well as the collat-
ing and distribution of information, are likely to be more muted than for
analysis and policymaking activities, where decentralization and indepen-
dence are particularly likely to spur valuable innovation.368
364 See, e.g., Aagaard, supra note 145, at 280. R
365 See, e.g., Eric T. Laity, The Corporation as Administrative Agency: Tax Expenditures
and Institutional Design, 28 VA. TAX REV. 411, 455 (2008).
366 See O’Connell, supra note 1, at 1680. R
367 See, e.g., Marisam, supra note 21, at 26–27 (arguing that while “the risk of free riding R
is substantial when Congress assigns the same tasks to multiple agencies,” that risk “is dimin-
ished when each agency contributes different information or performs different subtasks”).
368 See infra notes 370–75 and accompanying text. R
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One factor in determining whether to centralize on the one hand or
decentralize and coordinate on the other is the likelihood of innovation by
multiple governmental authorities. The more valuable innovations are likely
to be, the fewer advantages centralization is likely to offer. The analysis of
accumulated information, for example, may benefit from the experimenta-
tion and expertise benefits of decentralization, as multiple agencies may in-
terpret the same data in different ways or devise different strategies for
acting on that data. Decentralized information analysis therefore can reduce
the risk of groupthink that inhibits innovative action.369 Assuming some level
of decentralization, the choice between overlapping or distinct authority
might often be made by comparing the efficiency gains of distinct authority
with the redundancy advantages of overlap.
The value of centralizing scientific research and information dissemina-
tion has been recognized in a variety of regulatory contexts. For example, in
the environmental area, delegating these functions to state and local regula-
tors will tend to weaken technical capacity and forfeit economies of scale,
particularly because many scientific and technical questions will be the same
regardless of jurisdiction.370 In the field of national security, the costs of
harmonizing state and local data collection efforts may be high, and trust in
the accuracy of shared information may be greater if it is accumulated cen-
trally.371 Similarly, because healthcare regulation increasingly relies heavily
on data in the regulatory process, the need for diversity is not as great as the
need to develop the capacity to gather reliable data.372 In addition, the federal
government may have incentives to accumulate health care data that lower
levels of government lack, creating collective action problems in a decentral-
ized information-gathering regime.373
As with scientific research and information distribution, collective ac-
tion problems generally appear to provide a strong justification for centraliz-
ing the financing function for many substantive jurisdictional areas. States
and localities will often lack incentives to invest in intelligence and national
security functions, for example, because the risks of inadequate surveillance
may be externalized if terrorist activity is conducted in locations different
from where they are planned, and some jurisdictions may regard themselves
as at low risk. In addition, the political flack of ineffective counterterrorism
measures tends to be borne by the federal government.374 Finally, the federal
369 See O’Connell, supra note 1, at 1676. R
370 Esty, Environmental Federalism, supra note 6, at 614–15. R
371 See Waxman, supra note 241, at 344; but cf. id. at 345–46 (arguing that local law R
enforcers or partnerships between them and the federal government are likely to discover ter-
rorist activities conducted inside the United States, seeding “long-term, bottom-up learning”).
372 Moncrieff & Lee, supra note 247, at 278, 283. R
373 Id. at 280 (arguing that the Affordable Care Act falls short of “the full centralization
that seems functionally justified”).
374 Waxman, supra note 241, at 340–41. R
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government generally will have superior capacity to finance regulatory
programs.375
B. Decentralizing and Coordinating Monitoring Activity
The appropriate allocation of authority is likely to differ for other types
of information gathering. In contrast to scientific research, information dis-
tribution, and financing, the arguments for decentralization are likely to be
stronger for various monitoring activities, particularly of localized condi-
tions in fields of regulation such as environmental protection. Knowledge of
local pollution sources and conditions will often provide a stronger justifica-
tion for decentralized monitoring of current levels of pollution, for example,
than exists for the accumulation and analysis of information on matters such
as the degree of exposure to a particular pollutant that creates unacceptable
levels of health risk.376 Similarly, there are advantages to vesting in lower
levels of government the task of determining the effect of regulated activity
such as pollution on local populations, especially local concentrations of vul-
nerable or disadvantaged groups. These pockets of vulnerability may be
missed if monitoring is conducted at a larger scale by those with less access
to knowledge of peculiar local circumstances. Even in these circumstances,
however, sound reasons likely remain for coordinating information distribu-
tion systems among governmental authorities, or even centralizing the distri-
bution function in a dedicated authority. In addition, top-down mandates to
respond to the decentralized accumulation of information may be appropri-
ate. Again, context matters in getting the functional allocation right.
C. Decentralizing and Coordinating Distinct Planning Authority
The case for decentralized but coordinated planning generally seems
stronger than for other governmental functions. Planning, as used here, re-
fers to establishing a general framework for achieving regulatory policy that
is implemented through subsequent, more particularized management ac-
tions that conform to the plan. Superior knowledge of location-specific
needs and conditions may often support delegating planning responsibilities
to regional or local branches of federal agencies377 or to lower levels of gov-
ernment.378 In addition, the experimentation and learning benefits of plan-
ning by many agencies would frequently support decentralization.
375 David A. Super, Rethinking Fiscal Federalism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2544, 2648, 2652
(2005).
376 See David A. Strifling, Environmental Federalism and Effective Regulation of Na-
notechnology, 2010 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1129, 1171 (2010).
377 Planning for the national forests, for example, is conducted at the individual forest
level. 16 U.S.C. § 1604(f)(1) (2006). The same is true for individual units of the National Park
System. See 2 COGGINS & GLICKSMAN, supra note 60, § 16:4. R
378 The states are responsible for planning to achieve the national ambient air quality stan-
dards under the Clean Air Act. 42 U.S.C. § 7410 (2006).
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Conversely, economies of scale are likely to be more difficult to achieve
when planners must consider localized conditions in detail and the issues are
not entirely or even largely national in character, reducing the value of
centralization.
Assuming some level of decentralized planning authority is deemed ap-
propriate, policymakers also must consider how to situate that authority
along the overlap and coordination axes. Because overlapping planning ju-
risdiction creates the potential for inconsistent mandates, planning would ap-
pear to often be a good candidate for establishing an allocation of
substantively distinct authority. Regardless of whether authority is overlap-
ping or distinct, coordinated planning requirements may be essential to avoid
disastrous results like those experienced in the responses to Hurricane Ka-
trina.379 If, for example, the federal government is responsible for providing
food and water to populations affected by national disasters, they would
need to know where local authorities are planning to move at-risk popula-
tions.380 As compared to the value of harmonization, the value of competi-
tion among agencies may be relatively small at the planning stage. The risk
of holdouts, one of the anti-commons problems associated with excessive
coordination,381 might be minimized in some circumstances by authorizing
the federal government to take over the planning function if a state or local-
ity fails to bear its portion of the planning burden.382
D. Decentralizing Independent Implementation and Enforcement
Though increased inter-jurisdictional coordination may often make
more sense for functions such as ambient monitoring,383 financing, and plan-
ning, maintaining regulator independence for enforcement and implementa-
tion of centrally established standards or plans may more frequently be
beneficial. Arguments for decentralizing implementation and enforcement of
regulatory programs will likely be even more persuasive than for the plan-
ning function. Decentralized authority allows for a range of management
strategies in implementation, which should facilitate the development of spe-
cialized approaches tailored to local variations and circumstances. Further-
more, maintaining decentralized implementation and enforcement should
continue to provide opportunities for regulatory experimentation. Diversity
and experimentation benefits are often cited as justifications for decentraliz-
379 See David A. Super, Against Flexibility, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 1375, 1429–30 (2011);
Rep. Bennie G. Thompson (D-Miss.), A Legislative Prescription for Confronting 21st-century
Risks to the Homeland, 47 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 277, 305 (2010).
380 See DAVID M. DRIESEN ET AL., AN UNNATURAL DISASTER: THE AFTERMATH OF HURRI-
CANE KATRINA 27 (Sept. 2005), available at http://www.progressivereform.org/articles/Unnat-
ural_Disaster_512.pdf.
381 See supra notes 227–229 and accompanying text. R
382 See 42 U.S.C. § 7410(c) (2006) (authorizing EPA to adopt federal implementation plan
under the Clean Air Act).
383 See Biber, supra note 68, at 9. R
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ing implementation and enforcement activities in diverse regulatory areas
such as environmental,384 energy,385 and health care policy.386 Additionally,
collective action problems may be less likely to arise when implementation
and enforcement are decentralized than for other functions, particularly
when information gathering, financing and standard setting are centralized
and/or coordinated.387 On the other hand, decentralized implementation and
enforcement risk slippage, deviation from centrally established norms, or an
inequitable lack of uniformity. To counter these risks, it may be advisable to
retain centralized oversight of implementation and enforcement or central-
ized authority to supplement or displace decentralized choices.388
E. Reducing Functional Overlap in Conjunction with
Stronger Coordination
Though we largely agree with the literature asserting that overlapping
substantive jurisdiction provides a number of benefits,389 instituting redun-
dant governmental authority for every function would be valuable only in
very rare circumstances. Although shared regulatory authority coalesced
around particular substantive areas may often make sense, in many circum-
stances such jurisdictional redundancy is better focused on certain govern-
mental functions (such as implementation and enforcement) than
perfunctory duplication when there are few likely redundancy benefits (such
as in information dissemination). Thus, it often may be valuable to reduce
overlap in functional jurisdiction even as shared substantive jurisdiction is
maintained or increased.
Such reductions in functional overlap may often be usefully accompa-
nied by the establishment of formal, strong coordination mechanisms among
the agencies sharing substantive authority. That configuration would help
ensure that functionally distinct authorities are administered more efficiently
and effectively. Such a combined reorganization strategy may reduce the
inefficiencies commonly associated with overlap, while maintaining some of
384 See, e.g., Buzbee, supra note 163, at 1588–89; Esty, supra note 6, at 623. R
385 See, e.g., Pursley & Wiseman, supra note 329, at 946. R
386 See, e.g., Moncrieff & Lee, supra note 247, at 278, 283. R
387 Decentralization for either implementation or enforcement may not be appropriate,
however, for regulatory activities that raise collective action problems, such as inter-jurisdic-
tional externalities. Cf. Esty, Environmental Federalism, supra note 6, at 623–24 (discussing R
trans-boundary problems). Even in those circumstances, however, overlap among regulators—
and even delegation of enforcement authority to private entities through mechanisms such as
citizen suits—can protect against capture and regulatory inactivity. See, e.g., J. Maria Glover,
The Structural Role of Private Enforcement Mechanisms in Public Law, 53 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 1137, 1144–45, 1153 (2012).
388 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7410(c) (2006) (delegating to EPA the authority to establish
federal implementation plans to achieve the Clean Air Act’s national ambient air quality stan-
dards if state regulators fail to adopt adequate plans).
389 See supra Part III.B.2.
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the effectiveness and accountability benefits available through the coordina-
tion of shared substantive governance.
CONCLUSION
We have argued that policymakers and scholars analyzing alternative
ways of organizing or reorganizing government often fail to appreciate the
rich array of institutional design options. In particular, they often gloss over
or ignore the potential benefits of dividing up authority along functional in-
stead of purely jurisdictional lines. It is all too common for government offi-
cials and academics to consider only whether to create a centralized or
decentralized regulatory or management regime. It is more unusual to afford
full consideration to whether authority should be distinct or overlapping, and
whether multiple regulators should act independently or in coordinated fash-
ion. When these dimensions of authority have been considered, legislators
and scholars have typically conflated these fundamentally different features
of governmental authority, leading to mismatches between the perceived de-
fects of existing structures and the allocations of authority chosen to replace
them. We contend that those analyzing government organizational choices
should pay more attention to the option of defining jurisdiction functionally
or substantively and to the optimal placement of such authority along each
of the centralization, overlap, and independence dimensions. Perhaps most
importantly, government programs are most effective if organizational anal-
ysis includes assessments of whether the authority to perform one govern-
ment function should be aligned differently along the three-dimensional axes
than the authority to perform others that are part of the same regulatory or
management program.
Whether the allocational configurations described preliminarily in Part
V represent the optimal balance of values should be tested by further analy-
sis and experimentation in specific regulatory contexts. What is already clear
is that when Congress and other policymakers contemplate creating new
agencies or reorganizing existing ones, they should compare different ways
of structuring agency authority to assess which ones best address the con-
cerns that prompted the desire to create or reorganize agency programs. In
doing so, they should take into account both the full range of dimensions
along which authority may be structured, as well as the relative merits of
dimensional allocations of authority that differ by governmental function.
Policymakers may be able to achieve more while losing less, for example, by
coordinating existing overlapping agency authority rather than by centraliz-
ing it. Further, policymakers should consider whether a shift in functional as
opposed to substantive jurisdiction would better promote values such as ef-
fectiveness, efficiency, legitimacy, and fairness.
